### 1NC

####  “Financial incentives” are funding for investors to develop a project – that excludes nonfinancial incentives like procurement

Czinkota et al, 9 **-** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Violation – procurement are purchases that don’t motivate action – they just buy a technology that already exists

Nelson 93 (Edward W., Chairman – Payment Subcommittee in OPTN/UNOS Ethics Committee, “Financial Incentives for Organ Donation,” Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 6-30, <http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/bioethics.asp?index=4>)

Definition of Financial Incentives A definition of terms is necessary prior to a discussion of the concept of financial incentives for organ donation. First, financial incentives, as discussed here, do not mean additional monies spent for public or professional education or recognition and counseling of organ donor families. Because the concept of financial incentives fundamentally changes the process of organ procurement, it has been argued that the term "donor" is no longer applicable and would need to be replaced by a term such as 'vendor." The term "rewarded gifting" has been suggested and has been justly criticized as an oxymoron by those opposed to financial incentives and a despicable euphemism by those who promote this concept. Of greatest practical significance is the distinction between "incentive" and "payment" since a system of financial incentives may indeed be a viable option if, as interpreted by law, "incentives" do not amount to "purchases" and "donors" are therefore not transformed into 'vendors."

#### Incentives require explicit conditions in exchange for a desired good

Thale 98 (Geoff, Associate for El Salvador – Washington Office on Latin America, *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention*, p. 183)

The Nature of Incentives It is useful, in thinking about the effectiveness of various forms of incentives, to define more precisely the kinds of incentives that are being offered and the context in which they are offered. In its simplest form, an incentive is an offer by a sender to provide a good that the recipient desires, if the recipient engages in some specified behavior. Another more complicated form of incentive exists when the sender government offers a good directly related to the desired outcome—when, for example, a sender offers to fund postwar reconstruction programs on the condition that the recipient design and implement such programs. In this case, the recipient government may not desire, or at least not strongly desire, the ‘‘good’’ being offered, but may engage in the desired behavior because it is relatively cost free to the recipient. This will greatly influence the strength of the recipient’s commitment to carry out the desired behavior when the inevitable problems and complications occur.

#### Prefer our interpretation – they kill limits – they allow any aff that makes some technology more economically viable and allows the government to incentivize government action which is unpredictable. Procurement can be applied to every technology and every industry – that explodes neg burden.

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#### Revealing the world as threats to national security naturalizes the instrumentalization of Beings and warfare – makes war and intervention inevitable

**Burke 7** (Anthony Burke- Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, Theory & Event - Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007)

The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state. This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'. Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth. However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped? How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

#### Altenative – reject the affirmative’s security discourse – only resistance can generate genuine political thought

Neoclous 8 – Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debatesand discussionsthat animate political life. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'

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#### Text: The Department of Defense should enter into binding consultation with local communities surrounding relevant military bases over whether to procure small modular reactors for military installations in the United States. The Department of Defense should implement the result of the binding consultation. We’ll clarify.

#### It competes –

#### First – it tests “resolved” which means “to make a firm decision”, and “should” which is “used to imply obligation or duty”

[American Heritage Dictionary at dictionary.com]

#### Counterplans that test the resolution are key to predictable ground

#### Second – we have a solvency advocate – DoD nuclear power plants must include genuine consultation – that’s key to integration and overall base success

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### The net-benefit is community-military relations –

#### Current levels of negotiation are controlled by military leadership – the CP revives that by creating an open and cooperation relationship

Boccuti, Faul, and Gray 12 (Amanda, analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, providing analysis and GIS support for U.S. Marine Corps projects, Lauren, analyst for Marstel-Day, LLC, specializing in Strategic Communications, and Lauren, researcher at Marstel-Day, LLC, offering research and analysis of environmental issues for encroachment control plans and communications, outreach and engagement strategies for the U.S. Marine Corps, “Establishing Creative Strategies for Effective Engagement between Military Installations & Communities,” Engaging Cities, 5-12, <http://engagingcities.com/article/establishing-creative-strategies-effective-engagement-between-military-installations-communi>)

Throughout the Nation’s history, military installations and ranges were historically established in undeveloped areas, except for those forts located to defend cities. Local communities developed near the installations for safety and economic reasons resulting in the installation being the up-to-that-point rural community’s primary economic engine. Routine communication between the installations and local communities were minimal because the installation was self-supporting and not subject to local laws and regulations. Communications were primarily social. Starting in the post-World War II era and accelerating as the 20th Century came to a close, installation-adjacent communities increased in both density and size – becoming less rural, more suburban or urban, and more economically diverse. Military missions continue to evolve, incorporating new weapon platforms and training over larger areas and at all hours of the day and night. These changes in both surrounding communities and the installation missions have often lead to competing interests with respect to the economy, natural resource management, and land use. Military installations and local communities must, therefore, focus communication efforts on building partnerships to find mutually acceptable paths forward for resolving their competing interests. Developing collaborative relationships is imperative to turning otherwise conflicting interests into opportunities for mutually beneficial solutions. The nature of those interactions is defined by issue type, installation and community rapport, and available communication channels. The four military services (i.e., Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force) have service-specific community engagement programs to develop partnerships; all four, however, conduct information sharing through the Public Affairs Office (PAO), which handles media and public relations. Three of the services – the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force – have established encroachment management policies that outline service responsibilities to establish, maintain, and sustain community relationships in order to reduce encroachment effects. This responsibility is usually assigned to a Community Plans and Liaison Office (CPLO) or an equivalent community planner. The CPLO and PAO work with their installation Commander to act as the military’s voice and point of engagement in the community through consistent messaging, establishing an installation presence in community forums, and planning community-engagement events and processes. Though Department of Defense (DoD) mechanisms exist to develop community partnerships, mediating the different interests and priorities among military installations and their surrounding communities is a complex**,** nuanced process usually exercised by the services, through their installation leadership. Siting of renewable energy projects, environmental stewardship responsibilities, noise from training events, and other policy- and planning-related matters invoke difficult questions, such as: how can an installation and its surrounding communities concurrently pursue goals and development in a way that lead to mutual gain, obtaining threshold requirements and fair compromise? Finding interest nexuses and fostering an open, strong relationship in which those nexuses can be explored is key.

#### Locals will say yes. Absent consultation, civilian populations will fear military encroachment – that destroys military readiness and causes base closing

Savage 10 (Melissa, tracks military base issues for NCSL, “Lawmakers are looking for ways to resolve land-use conflicts between civilian communities and military bases,” National Conference of State Legislatures, March, <http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/making-peace-article.aspx>)

Senator Leticia Van de Putte, who represents the district that is home to Fort Sam Houston—another military base near San Antonio—has seen the consequences of residential development near military bases. It’s in her backyard. But she also knows the encroachment issue isn’t confined to San Antonio. It’s a problem for bases across the country, from the Marine’s Camp Pendleton in southern California to the Army’s Fort A.P. Hill in northern Virginia. “For legislators with installations in their district, it’s critical that they stay aware of what’s happening on the bases, in the community and how state legislation can play a role in helping strike a balance between the community’s needs and ensuring the military base can meet its mission,” Van de Putte says. “The good news is that, while encroachment is pretty common, states, military bases and local communities are working together. Partnerships among states, cities and military bases are becoming the premier strategy to accomplish common goals.” Role of Military Bases During the last several years of base closures, communities have fought to keep their bases open for many reasons, but mostly because of the huge economic benefits military bases can bring to local communities and states. They generate civilian jobs and pour millions of dollars each year into the local economy. The loss of a base can be devastating to a community. In San Antonio, the U.S. Department of Defense is one of the largest employers, providing jobs to more than 68,000 people, a third of them civilians. According to the Department of Defense, the direct and indirect economic effect of the military in San Antonio was more than $13.3 billion in 2006. As development inches closer to installations, limiting the ability to conduct effective military training, the Department of Defense might be left with no other choice than to close bases. Maryland Delegate Sally Jameson knows just what military bases can mean to a community. “For those of us with bases in our districts, we relish the jobs and dollars that spin into our local economies,” she says. “In some areas, the loss of a base could mean the destruction of the local community. “The next step is to realize the significant problems bases can face when dealing with encroachment. It can stand in the way of our bases meeting their No. 1 priority—troop readiness. Staying focused on land issues and keeping the lines of communication open with base leadership is so important.” Years ago, when the Department of Defense located many of its current military installations, it looked for land in the middle of nowhere. Having space to train away from cities limits the impact of light pollution on flight paths and keeps citizens on the other side of the fence safe during live fire training exercises. Over the last few decades, as cities have grown closer to the installations, the impact on the military sometimes has been severe. While base commanding officers will tell you they want to be good neighbors, their primary mission is to train soldiers to fight.

#### Readiness collapse causes war – turns the heg advantage

Spencer 2K (Jack, Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, The Facts About Military Readiness, 9-15, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/MissileDefense/BG1394.cfm>)

The evidence indicates that the U.S. armed forces are not ready to support America's national security requirements. Moreover, regarding the broader capability to defeat groups of enemies, military readiness has been declining. The National Security Strategy, the U.S. official statement of national security objectives, 3 concludes that the United States "must have the capability to deter and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames." 4 According to some of the military's highest-ranking officials, however, the United States cannot achieve this goal. Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Jones, former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan have all expressed serious concerns about their respective services' ability to carry out a two major theater war strategy. 5 Recently retired Generals Anthony Zinni of the U.S. Marine Corps and George Joulwan of the U.S. Army have even questioned America's ability to conduct one major theater war the size of the 1991 Gulf War. 6 Military readiness is vital because declines in America's military readiness signal to the rest of the world that the United States is not prepared to defend its interests. Therefore, potentially hostile nations will be more likely to lash out against American allies and interests, inevitably leading to U.S. involvement in combat. A high state of military readiness is more likely to deter potentially hostile nations from acting aggressively in regions of vital national interest, thereby preserving peace.

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#### Obama will win – consensus of state polls which are historically MORE ACCURATE and LESS BIASED than national polls

Silver 10/31/12 (Nate, Founder @ FiveThirtyEight.com, "Oct. 30: What State Polls Suggest About the National Popular Vote," http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/oct-30-what-state-polls-suggest-about-the-national-popular-vote/)

Yes, I am deliberately cherry-picking a bit. But the discrepancy seems to hold if you look at the data in a more comprehensive way. Nor is it an unusual feature of the FiveThirtyEight model. Rather, pretty much every method for evaluating the election based on state polls seems to hint at a very slight popular vote lead for Mr. Obama, along with an Electoral College one.¶ In the table below, I’ve listed the current forecasts at seven different Web sites that use state polls, sometimes along with a modicum of other information like a state’s past voting history, to produce predictions of the popular vote in each state.¶ The first of these sites is FiveThirtyEight. The others, in the order that they’re listed in the table, are Electoral-Vote.com; Votamatic, by the Emory University political scientist Drew Linzer; HuffPost Pollster; Real Clear Politics; Talking Points Memo’s PollTracker; and the Princeton Election Consortium, which is run by Sam Wang, a neuroscientist at Princeton. These are pretty much all the sites I’m aware of that use state polling data in a systematic way.¶ You can see that the various projections strongly agree with another, for the most part, in making “calls” about individual states. The only state where different sites show different candidates ahead right now is Florida, where Talking Points Memo gives Mr. Obama a nominal 0.2-percentage point lead while the others (including FiveThirtyEight) have Mr. Romney slightly up instead. There are also four states — New Hampshire, Iowa, Colorado and Virginia — in which some methods show an exactly tied race while others give Mr. Obama the lead.¶ Although I hope that this chart serves as a useful reference point — and as a reminder that other data-driven sites that look at the polls with the same philosophy that FiveThirtyEight applies are achieving largely the same results — I’m more interested in looking at this data in a macroscopic way.¶ Suppose, for example, that you take the consensus forecast in each state. (By “consensus” I just mean: the average of the different forecasts.) Then you weigh it based on what each state’s share of the overall turnout was in 2008, in order to produce an estimate of the national popular vote.¶ Do the math, and you’ll find that this implies that Mr. Obama leads nationally by 1.9 percentage points — by no means a safe advantage, but still a better result for him than what the national polls suggest.¶ What if turnout doesn’t look like it did in 2008? Instead, what if the share of the votes that each state contributed was the same as in 2004, a better Republican year?¶ That doesn’t help to break the discord between state and national polls, unfortunately. Mr. Obama would lead by two percentage points in the consensus forecast weighing the states by their 2004 turnout.¶ Or we can weigh the states by their turnout in 2010, a very good Republican year. But that doesn’t help, either: instead, Mr. Obama leads by 2.1 percentage points based on this method.¶ (In each of these examples, you’d get almost exactly the same outcome if you used the FiveThirtyEight forecast alone rather than the consensus. We’re on the high end and the low end of the consensus in different states for Mr. Romney and Mr. Obama, but it pretty much balances out over all.)¶ Whether the state polls or the national polls characterize the election correctly could well determine its outcome.¶ Mr. Obama’s lead in the Electoral College is modest, but also quite consistent across the different methods. The states in which every site has Mr. Obama leading make up 271 electoral votes — one more than the president needs to clinch victory. The states in which everyone has Mr. Romney ahead represent 206 electoral votes. That leaves five states, and 61 electoral votes, unaccounted for — but Mr. Obama would not need them if he prevails in the states where he is leading in the polls.¶ But perhaps national polls tell the right story of the race instead — meaning that the state polls systematically overrate Mr. Obama’s standing?¶ It’s certainly possible. (It keeps me up late at night.) If the polls in states like Ohio and Wisconsin are wrong, then FiveThirtyEight — and all of our competitors that build projections based on state polls — will not have a happy Nov. 6.¶ With that said, our decision to cast our lot mostly with the state polls is not arbitrary. In recent years, they’ve been a slightly more unbiased indicator of how the election will play out.¶ Bias, in a statistical sense, means missing consistently in one direction — for example, overrating the Republican’s performance across a number of different examples, or the Democrat’s. It is to be distinguished from the term accuracy, which refers to how close you come to the outcome in either direction. If our forecasts miss high on Mr. Obama’s vote share by 10 percentage points in Nevada, but miss low on it by 10 percentage points in Iowa, our forecasts won’t have been very accurate, but they also won’t have been biased since the misses were in opposite directions (they’ll just have been bad).¶ In a previous article, I examined the history of bias in public polls based on whether they’ve tended systematically to overrate the standing of the Democrat or the Republican. (The answer is that they don’t exhibit either bias on a consistent basis, as long as your using likely voter polls; registered voter polls will tend to overstate the vote for the Democrat.)¶ This article also contained a comparison between state and national polls in the presidential race: which have been more free of bias?¶ In recent elections — since state polling data became more robust — it’s the state polls that have done a bit better. This was especially so in 1996, when national polls implied a double-digit victory for Bill Clinton over Bob Dole (and Ross Perot) but state polls were more in line with the single-digit victory that he actually achieved. In 2000, state polls provided an accurate portrayal of a too-close-to-call race, while national polls missed high on George W. Bush vs. Al Gore.¶ There have been other years like 1992 in which the national polls did a bit better. But on average since that year, the state polls have had a bias of 1.1 percentage points — half as much as the national polls, which have had a 2.1-point bias instead.¶ We’re approaching the point where Mr. Romney may need the state polls to be systematically biased against him in order to win the Electoral College. And that certainly could turn out to be the case: if Mr. Romney wins the popular vote by more than about two percentage points, for example, he’ll be very likely to cobble together a winning electoral map, somehow and some way. (And he’ll be a virtual lock if the results are in line with Mr. Romney’s best national polls, like the Gallup survey, which put him four or five points ahead.)¶ But the historical evidence weighs in slightly more heavily on behalf of the state polls, in my view, when they seem to contradict the national ones. If the state polls are right, than Mr. Obama is not just the favorite in the Electoral College but probably also in the popular vote.¶ Tuesday’s Polls¶ Mr. Obama made gains in the FiveThirtyEight forecast on Tuesday, with his chances of winning the Electoral College increasing to 77.4 percent.¶ A fair amount of this boils down to Ohio, where three polls released on Tuesday gave Mr. Obama leads by margins ranging from three to five percentage points. Two of the polls, from Grove Research and the Mellman Group, generally show strong results for Democrats, which give them less impact in the forecast after applying our adjustment for pollster “house effects”. Still, the three polls taken collectively were enough to widen Mr. Obama’s projected lead in Ohio to 2.4 percentage points from 2.1 on Monday. Given how central Ohio is to each candidate’s electoral strategy — and how little time remains in the race — this was enough to improve Mr. Obama’s Electoral College chances. (The forecast does not yet account for the poll by Quinnipiac University for The New York Times and CBS News, which had Mr. Obama five points ahead in Ohio but which was released after we had run the model for the night.)

#### The plan can still change the outcome of the election --- it’s not too late

Cohn 10/24/2012 (Nate – has no professional NBA team to cheer for, rising election states master , Expect the Unexpected: Diverse Battleground States Mean the Race Can Shift in Any Number of Ways, Electionate, The New Republic, p. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/electionate/109067/diverse-and-competitive-electoral-map-introduces-more-possibilities-surprisi>)

None of these scenarios are particularly probable, especially individually. But one way or another, we could easily be surprised between now and the time the election is called in 13 days. The polls are pretty good, but they are not perfect, and with observers paying so much attention to the slight distinctions between Obama's 1.9 point lead in Ohio and .6 point lead in Virginia, unrealistic levels of precision may be necessary to avoid surprises. And that's before accounting for the possibility that the race could **shift over the final two weeks** in subtle ways that move particular demographic groups and states without similar changes in others. The nine battleground states are so close and so diverse that late movement among specific demographic groups or slight errors in the polling could easily **reshape the electoral map before November 6**.

#### Nuclear power incentives are massively unpopular --- the public does not want to foot the cost

Sheppard 11, 3/23/2011 (Kate – staff reporter at Mother Jones’ Washington bureau, Public Opinion on Nuclear Goes Critical, Mother Jones, p. <http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/03/nuclear-power-public-opinion-poll>)

It's probably not too surprising, given the constant attention it's been getting in the press recently, but the Japanese nuclear crisis has turned more Americans off to nuclear power. Two new polls released Tuesday found that 58 percent of those polled said they are now less supportive of expanding nuclear power here in the US. The poll, conducted by ORC International on behalf of the Civil Society Institute (CSI), found that two-thirds of respondents said they would protest the construction of a new nuclear reactor within 50 miles of their homes. Fifty-three percent said they support "a moratorium on new nuclear reactor construction in the United States" and would prefer energy efficiency and renewables. (It's worth noting, though, that among those that already supported of nuclear power, 24 percent now said they are actually more supportive now.) The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press also released a new poll on Tuesday that found nuclear support had taken a nose-dive. As for funding these new nuclear plants, 73 percent in the CSI poll said they don't think taxpayers should "take on the risk for the construction of new nuclear power reactors" with federal loan guarantees. The Obama administration has made expanding the loan guarantees a major part of its energy agenda, but there have been plenty of concerns about forcing taxpayers to foot the bill if something goes wrong. When Gallup last polled Americans on nuclear power in 2009, it found support at a new high—59 percent of the public favored it. It had been years since a nuclear accident was all over the news. But as I noted last week, the last major nuclear power accident in the US was enough to turn Americans off from it for a generation. I ventured then that this latest situation in Japan may have a similar effect. Given that the latest polls were conducted in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster, it's unclear what their conclusions mean for the future of nuclear power. What will be interesting is the longer-term influence on public opinion once Japan's nuclear emergency fades from the news.

#### Obama reelection maintains the US/Russian reset --- Romney will collapse relations

Weir 12, 3/27/2012 (Fred, Obama asks Russia to cut him slack until reelection, Minnesota Post, p. <http://www.minnpost.com/christian-science-monitor/2012/03/obama-asks-russia-cut-him-slack-until-reelection>)

Russian experts say there's little doubt the Kremlin would like to see Obama re-elected. Official Moscow has been pleased by Obama's policy of "resetting" relations between Russia and the US, which resulted in the new START treaty and other cooperation breakthroughs after years of diplomatic chill while George W. Bush was president. The Russian media often covers Obama's lineup of Republican presidential challengers in tones of horror, and there seems to be a consensus among Russian pundits that a Republican president would put a quick end to the Obama-era thaw in relations. "The Republicans are active critics of Russia, and they are extremely negative toward Putin and his return to the presidency," says Dmitry Babich, a political columnist with the official RIA-Novosti news agency. "Democrats are perceived as more easygoing, more positive toward Russia and Putin." Speaking on the record in Seoul, Mr. Medvedev said the years since Obama came to power "were the best three years in the past decade of Russia-US relations.… I hope this mode of relations will maintain between the Russian Federation and the United States and between the leaders." During Putin's own election campaign, which produced a troubled victory earlier this month, he played heavily on anti-Western themes, including what he described as the US drive to attain "absolute invulnerability" at the expense of everyone else. But many Russian experts say that was mostly election rhetoric, and that in office Putin will seek greater cooperation and normal relations with the West. "Russian society is more anti-American than its leaders are," says Pavel Zolotaryov, deputy director of the official Institute of USA-Canada Studies in Moscow. "Leaders have to take popular moods into account. But it's an objective fact that the US and Russia have more points in common than they have serious differences. If Obama wins the election, it seems likely the reset will continue."

#### US/Russian relations prevent nuclear war

Allison & Blackwill 11 [Graham, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School, former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, Robert D., Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy -- Council on Foreign Relations, served as U.S. ambassador to India and as deputy national security adviser for strategic planning in the Bush administration, both co-chairmen of the Task Force on Russia and U.S. National Interests, co-sponsored by the Belfer Center and the Center for the National Interest, 10-30-11 Politico, “10 reasons why Russia still matters,” <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups.

### 1NC

#### Electricity prices are declining in the status quo

**Burtraw 12** (one of the nation’s foremost experts on environmental regulation in the electricity sector. “Falling Emissions and Falling Prices: Expectations for the Domestic Natural Gas Boom” http://common-resources.org/2012/falling-emissions-and-falling-prices-expectations-for-the-domestic-natural-gas-boom/)

Moreover, the boom in domestic natural gas production could have even more immediate affects for U.S. electricity consumers. The increased supply of gas is expected to lower natural gas prices and retail electricity prices over the next 20 years, according to a [new RFF Issue Brief](http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22019). These price decreases are expected to be even larger if demand for electricity continues on a slow-growth trajectory brought on by the economic downturn and the increased use of energy efficiency.For example, RFF analysis found that delivered natural gas prices would have been almost 35% higher in 2020 if natural gas supply projections had matched the lower estimates released by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2009. Instead, with an increased gas supply, consumers can expect to pay $4.9 per MMBtu for delivered natural gas in 2020 instead of $6.6 per MMBtu. These trends are even more exaggerated if demand for electricity were to increase to levels projected by the EIA just three years ago, in 2009.This decrease in natural gas prices is expected to translate into a decrease in retail electricity prices for most electricity customers in most years out to 2020. Compared to the world with the lower gas supply projections, average national electricity prices are expected to be almost 6% lower, falling from 9.25 cents to 8.75 cents per kilowatt-hour in 2020. Residential, commercial, and industrial customers are all expected to see a price decrease, with the largest price changes occurring in parts of the country that have competitive electricity markets. All of these prices decreases translate into real savings for most electricity customers. The savings are largest for commercial customers, who stand to save $33.9 Billion (real $2009) under the new gas supply projections in 2020. Residential customers also stand to save big, with estimates of $25.8 Billion (real $2009) in savings projected for 2020.

#### But, new nuclear reactors drive up electricity prices

Cooper 9 (Mark, SENIOR FELLOW FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, "THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR RELAPSE?," <http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/Cooper%20Report%20on%20Nuclear%20Economics%20FINAL%5B1%5D.pdf>)

Within the past year, estimates of the cost of nuclear power from a new generation of reactors have ranged from a low of 8.4 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) to a high of 30 cents. This paper tackles the debate over the cost of building new nuclear reactors, with the key findings as follows: • The initial cost projections put out early in today’s so-called “nuclear renaissance” were about one-third of what one would have expected, based on the nuclear reactors completed in the 1990s. • The most recent cost projections for new nuclear reactors are, on average, over four times as high as the initial “nuclear renaissance” projections. • There are numerous options available to meet the need for electricity in a carbon-constrained environment that are superior to building nuclear reactors. Indeed, nuclear reactors are the worst option from the point of view of the consumer and society. • The low carbon sources that are less costly than nuclear include efficiency, cogeneration, biomass, geothermal, wind, solar thermal and natural gas. Solar photovoltaics that are presently more costly than nuclear reactors are projected to decline dramatically in price in the next decade. Fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, which are not presently available, are projected to be somewhat more costly than nuclear reactors. • Numerous studies by Wall Street and independent energy analysts estimate efficiency and renewable costs at an average of 6 cents per kilowatt hour, while the cost of electricity from nuclear reactors is estimated in the range of 12 to 20 cents per kWh. • The additional cost of building 100 new nuclear reactors, instead of pursuing a least cost efficiency-renewable strategy, would be in the range of $1.9-$4.4 trillion over the life the reactors. Whether the burden falls on ratepayers (in electricity bills) or taxpayers (in large subsidies), incurring excess costs of that magnitude would be a substantial burden on the national economy and add immensely to the cost of electricity and the cost of reducing carbon emissions.

#### Low electricity prices spurs manufacturing "reshoring" and sparks US economic growth

Perry 7/31/12 (Mark, Prof of Economics @ Univ. of Michigan, "America's Energy Jackpot: Industrial Natural Gas Prices Fall to the Lowest Level in Recent History," http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2012/07/americas-energy-jackpot-industrial.html)

Building petrochemical plants could suddenly become attractive in the United States. Manufacturers will "reshore" production to take advantage of low natural gas and electricity prices. Energy costs will be lower for a long time, giving a competitive advantage to companies that invest in America, and also helping American consumers who get hit hard when energy prices spike. After years of bad economic news, the natural gas windfall is very good news. Let's make the most of it." The falling natural gas prices also make the predictions in this December 2011 study by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "Shale gas: A renaissance in US manufacturing?"all the more likely: U.S. manufacturing companies (chemicals, metals and industrial) could employ approximately one million more workers by 2025 because of abundant, low-priced natural gas. Lower feedstock and energy cost could help U.S. manufacturers reduce natural gas expenses by as much as $11.6 billion annually through 2025. MP: As I have emphasized lately, America's ongoing shale-based energy revolution is one of the real bright spots in an otherwise somewhat gloomy economy, and provides one of the best reasons to be bullish about America's future. The shale revolution is creating thousands of well-paying, shovel-ready jobs in Texas, North Dakota and Ohio, and thousands of indirect jobs in industries that support the shale boom (sand, drilling equipment, transportation, infrastructure, steel pipe, restaurants, etc.). In addition, the abundant shale gas is driving down energy prices for industrial, commercial, residential and electricity-generating users, which frees up billions of dollars that can be spent on other goods and services throughout the economy, providing an energy-based stimulus to the economy. Cheap natural gas is also translating into cheaper electricity rates, as low-cost natural gas displaces coal. Further, cheap and abundant natural gas is sparking a manufacturing renaissance in energy-intensive industries like chemicals, fertilizers, and steel. And unlike renewable energies like solar and wind, the natural gas boom is happening without any taxpayer-funded grants, subsidies, credits and loans. Finally, we get an environmental bonus of lower CO2 emissions as natural gas replaces coal for electricity generation. Sure seems like a win, win, win, win situation to me.

#### Econ decline risks extinction

Auslin 9 (Michael, Resident Scholar – American Enterprise Institute, and Desmond Lachman – Resident Fellow – American Enterprise Institute, “The Global Economy Unravels”, Forbes, 3-6, <http://www.aei.org/article/100187>)

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. Even apparently stable societies face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that coalesce into a big bang.

### 1NC

#### The nuclear arsenal will be modernized now – but risks cuts from the defense budget

Washington Post, 9/15/12 (Dana Priest, “Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-nuclear-arsenal-is-ready-for-overhaul/2012/09/15/428237de-f830-11e1-8253-3f495ae70650_story.html>)

The U.S. nuclear arsenal, the most powerful but indiscriminate class of weapons ever created, is set to undergo the costliest overhaul in its history, even as the military faces spending cuts to its conventional arms programs at a time of fiscal crisis.¶ For two decades, U.S. administrations have confronted the decrepit, neglected state of the aging nuclear weapons complex. Yet officials have repeatedly put off sinking huge sums into projects that receive little public recognition, driving up the costs even further.¶ Now, as the nation struggles to emerge from the worst recession of the postwar era and Congress faces an end-of-year deadline to avoid $1.2 trillion in automatic cuts to the federal budget over 10 years, the Obama administration is overseeing the gargantuan task of modernizing the nuclear arsenal to keep it safe and reliable.

#### The aff causes DoD budget tradeoffs

Snider, 12 – reporter for E&E (Annie, 2/23, “Military’s alt energy programs draw Republicans’ ire,” <http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/02/23/2>)

The idea that the administration is using DOD as a more politically palatable vehicle for renewable energy investments is now reverberating across Capitol Hill, even as Pentagon officials flatly deny the allegations.¶ At a budget hearing last week, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, the department's most high-profile alternative energy advocate, took volley after volley from Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee. They said that his priorities were misplaced, argued that spending on clean energy was taking money out of more important missions and hinted at a link between the Pentagon's green efforts and the prominence of former Silicon Valley clean-tech investors within the Obama administration.¶ "You're not the secretary of the energy, you're the secretary of the Navy," said Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.), who leads the subcommittee with jurisdiction over military energy and environment issues.¶ Prime among the lawmakers' complaints was that the military is paying a higher price for some forms of alternative energy at a time when DOD proposes cutting weapons programs and reducing forces in order to meet budget mandates.

#### Nuclear modernization will be the first to be cut – it’s on the chopping block – that destroys deterrence

Trachtenberg, 11 – president and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting, LLC, former principal deputy assistant secretary of defense (international security policy), acting deputy assistant secretary of defense (forces policy), and head of the policy staff of the House Armed Services Committee (David J, 10/1. “Nuclear Fallback.” ,” [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279610/nuclear-fallback-david-j-trachtenberg#](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279610/nuclear-fallback-david-j-trachtenberg))

Political turmoil in the Middle East, Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons, and the buildup of China’s military are only a few of the worrisome trends that point to a prolonged period of global instability. Against this backdrop, the U.S. defense budget and the military capabilities it buys are being dramatically reduced in ways that will hinder our ability to shape or respond to these developments.¶ Over the next decade, defense spending will drop by anywhere from $450 billion to more than $1 trillion. The full extent of the cuts, and the national-security implications they foreshadow, are now in the hands of a congressional “supercommittee” charged with slashing overall federal spending. But cuts of this magnitude will translate into less military capability, a likely “dumbing down” of U.S. military strategy, a more problematic margin of military advantage over potential adversaries, and greater strategic risk. They are also likely to diminish America’s ability to advance U.S. policy objectives and secure a stable world order.¶ Not surprisingly, long-overdue investments in our aging and deteriorating nuclear capabilities and infrastructure — essential to maintaining a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent — are now on the chopping block as the military services seek to protect “usable” non-nuclear systems at the expense of “unusable” nuclear ones.¶ But the world remains a dangerous place, with nations and groups seeking nuclear weapons as a counter to U.S. military preponderance, a deterrent to U.S. action in regions vital to American national-security interests, a bargaining chip for political leverage, or a counter to regional threats. Nuclear weapons remain the great equalizer in world affairs, granting those that possess them greater influence over American policies and actions. Consequently, an effective and robust U.S. nuclear deterrent remains as important as ever.

#### Deterrence is vital to prevent WMD attacks and preserve global stability

Mark **Schneider**, July **2008**. Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, Ph.D in history at the University of Southern California and JD from George Washington University, former senior officer in the DoD in positions relating to arms control and nuclear weapons policy. “The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent,” Comparative Strategy 27.4, Ebsco.

Today, the United States, the world's only superpower with global responsibilities, is the only nuclear weapons state that is seriously debating (admittedly largely inside the beltway) about whether the United States should retain a nuclear deterrent. By contrast, the British Labour Government has decided to retain and modernize its nuclear deterrent. In every other nuclear weapons state—Russia, China, France, India, Pakistan, and allegedly Israel—there is general acceptance of the need for a nuclear deterrent and its modernization. Amazingly, the United States is the only nuclear-armed nation that is not modernizing its nuclear deterrent. Distinguished former leaders such a George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, despite the manifest failure of arms control to constrain the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, call for “A world free of Nuclear Weapons” because “… the United States can address almost all of its military objectives by non-nuclear means.”1 This view ignores the monumental verification problems involved and the military implication of different types of WMD—chemical and biological (CBW) attack, including the advanced agents now available to potential enemies of the United States and our allies. A U.S. nuclear deterrent is necessary to address existing threats to the very survival of the U.S., its allies, and its armed forces if they are subject to an attack using WMD. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch wrote in The Wall Street Journal, “However, the goal, even the aspirational goal, of eliminating all nuclear weapons is counterproductive. It will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.”2 Why can't the United States deter WMD (nuclear, chemical, biological) attack with conventional weapons? The short answer is that conventional weapons can't deter a WMD attack because of their minuscule destructiveness compared with WMD, which are thousands to millions of times as lethal as conventional weapons. Existing WMD can kill millions to hundreds of millions of people in an hour, and there are national leaders who would use them against us if all they had to fear was a conventional response. The threat of nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack, as assessed by a Congressional Commission in 2004, is so severe that one or at most a handful of EMP attacks could demolish industrial civilization in the United States.3 The view that conventional weapons can replace nuclear weapons in deterrence or warfighting against a state using WMD is not technically supportable. Precision-guided conventional weapons are fine substitutes for non-precision weapons, but they do not remotely possess the lethality of WMD warheads. Moreover, their effectiveness in some cases can be seriously degraded by counter-measures and they clearly are not effective against most hard and deeply buried facilities that are associated with WMD threats and national leadership protection. If deterrence of WMD attack fails, conventional weapons are unlikely to terminate adversary WMD attacks upon us and our allies or to deter escalation. Are there actual existing threats to the survival of the United States? The answer is unquestionably “yes.” Both Russia and China have the nuclear potential to destroy the United States (and our allies) and are modernizing their forces with the objective of targeting the United States.4 China is also increasing the number of its nuclear weapons.5 Russia is moving away from democracy, and China remains a Communist dictatorship. A number of hostile dictatorships—North Korea, Iran, and possibly Syria—have or are developing longer-range missiles, as well as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.6 They already have the ability to launch devastating WMD attacks against our allies and our forward deployed forces, and in time may acquire capabilities against the United States. Iran will probably have nuclear weapons within approximately 2 to 5 years.7 The United States already faces a chemical and biological weapons threat despite arms control prohibitions. Due to arms control, we do not have an in-kind deterrent. Both Iranian and Syria acquisition of nuclear weapons could be affected by sales from North Korea, which have been reported in the press.8

### 1NC – Military Advantage

#### Backup capacity solves blackouts

Aimone 9-12 (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf)

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk. 1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission critical activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

#### Military SMRs rely on foreign grids that are fragile – takes out solvency

Smith 11 (Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy – CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2-16, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)

Nowhere in these key points is there even a hint of, “Hey this is not necessarily the best thing since sliced bread.” My initial response to each of these “key points”: (1) Takes the assumption it is a good idea and pushes a pursuit of the capability soon and hard to maintain a competitive technological edge, before examining the wisdom of the idea to begin with; (2) Just because DoD is interested in it, does not make it a good idea; (3) Arguing that they are better than larger reactors is not an argument for them being a good idea; (4) See my first point, but add in military advantage. The report describes DoD’s interest in the reactors as stemming from two “critical vulnerabilities”: 1) “the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid,” and 2) “the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations.” The proposed solution: small nuclear reactors that (in many of the proposed plans) are “self-contained and highly mobile.” This would allow the military to use them in forward bases and pack ‘em up and move ‘em out when we are done. But in an era where the U.S. is engaged in global fights with our bases often placed in unfriendly neighborhoods, the idea of driving around nuclear reactors and material (particularly through areas that have “ a fragile civilian electrical grid”) hardly seems like the idea of the century to me. The report counters that “some” designs promise to be “virtually impervious to accidents” and have design characteristics that “might” allow them to be proliferation-resistant. The plans that use low-enriched uranium, sealed reactor cores, ect., do make them a safer option that some current designs of larger nuclear reactors, but, again, if we are going to be trucking these things around the world, when it comes to nuclear material a “might” doesn’t sit well with me.

#### No risk of cyberattack and no impact

Birch, 10/1/12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

#### Nuclear weapons are protected from hacking

Green 2 (Joshua, Editor – Washington Monthly, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism”, Washington Monthly, November,

http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html#byline)

When ordinary people imagine cyberterrorism, they tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons, airliners, or military computers from halfway around the world. Given the colorful history of federal boondoggles--billion-dollar weapons systems that misfire, $600 toilet seats--that's an understandable concern. But, with few exceptions, it's not one that applies to preparedness for a cyberattack. "The government is miles ahead of the private sector when it comes to cybersecurity," says Michael Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a Virginia-based computer security company with government and private-sector clients. "Particularly the most sensitive military systems." Serious effort and plain good fortune have combined to bring this about. Take nuclear weapons. The biggest fallacy about their vulnerability, promoted in action thrillers like WarGames, is that they're designed for remote operation. "[The movie] is premised on the assumption that there's a modem bank hanging on the side of the computer that controls the missiles," says Martin Libicki, a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. "I assure you, there isn't." Rather, nuclear weapons and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security: they're "air-gapped," meaning that they're not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers. (Nuclear weapons also contain "permissive action links," mechanisms to prevent weapons from being armed without inputting codes carried by the president.) A retired military official was somewhat indignant at the mere suggestion: "As a general principle, we've been looking at this thing for 20 years. What cave have you been living in if you haven't considered this [threat]?"

#### Readiness collapse inevitable – equipment shortfalls

Perry and Flournoy 6 (William and Michael, “The US Military: Under Strain and at Risk”, National Defense Magazine, May, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/may/TheU.S.MilitaryUnder.htm)

The Army and the Army National Guard also have experienced **equipment shortfalls** that increased the level of risk to forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan and **reduced the readiness** of units in the United States. From the beginning of the Iraq war until as late as last year, the active Army experienced shortages of key equipment — such as radios, up-armored Humvees, trucks, machine guns, rifles, grenade launchers, and night vision equipment — for troops deploying overseas.  While many of these shortfalls havenow been addressed for deployed units, the readiness ratings of many non-deployed units have dropped. This is particularly worrisome because some of these units are slated to deploy later this year. This situation is even worse for Army National Guard units, many of which have had to leave their equipment sets in Iraq for arriving units. These readiness shortfalls are only likely to grow as the war in Iraq continues to accelerate the wear-out rate of all categories of equipment for ground forces.

#### Heg doesn’t prevent war

**Fettweis 10** (Christopher J. Professor of Political Science at Tulane, Dangerous Times-The International Politics of Great Power Peace, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly,the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

US hegemony will guarantee US-Sino conflict with flashpoints across Asia

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is the Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, “The Global Power Shift from West to East”, April 25th, 2012, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796>, Chetan]

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now **Beijing aims to dominate its own** East and Southeast Asian **backyard,** just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. **The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia**. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China’s quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. **This contest for regional dominance is fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war**. In geopolitics, **two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities. Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the** **unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers.**

Extinction

Straits Times – 2k [“Regional Fallout: No one gains in war over Taiwan,” June 25, Available Online via Lexis-Nexis]

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

#### Primacy spurs proliferation among non-state and rogue state actors.

**Weber et al 7** [Steven - Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley, et al., with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, 2007 [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premiere, p. 51-52]

The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. It didn’t need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea’s founder, Kim Il Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It’s often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one—nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn’t permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America’s burden.

### 1NC – Prolif

#### No widespread proliferation

Hymans 12 (Jacques, Associate Professor of International Relations – USC, North Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, Foreign Affairs, 4-16, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessons-for-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show)

Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a result of the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation. For decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread to every corner of the earth. **Such warnings have routinely proved wrong** - for instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown. Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years of the nuclear age. As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a consequence of their poorly built political institutions. In such dysfunctional states, the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to finger-pointing and recrimination. **These problems are debilitating**, and **they cannot be fixed** simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

#### Prolif will be limited and slow

#### Yusuf 9 (Moeed, Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate in the Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range

Future – Boston University, “Predicting Proliferation: The History of the Future of Nuclear Weapons”, Brookings Policy Paper 11, January, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/01\_nuclear\_proliferation\_ yusuf/01\_nuclear\_proliferation\_yusuf.pdf)

It is a paradox that few aspects of international security have been as closely scrutinized, but as incorrectly forecast, as the future nuclear landscape. Since the advent of nuclear weapons in 1945, there have been dozens, if not hundreds of projections by government and independent analysts trying to predict horizontal and vertical proliferation across the world. Various studies examined which countries would acquire nuclear weapons, when this would happen, how many weapons the two superpowers as well as other countries would assemble, and the impact these developments might have on world peace. The results have oscillated between gross underestimations and terrifying overestimations. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the fear that nuclear weapons might be acquired by so-called “rogues states” or terrorist groups brought added urgency – and increased difficulty – to the task of accurately assessing the future of nuclear weapons. A survey of past public and private projections provides a timely reminder of the flaws in both the methodologies and theories they employed. Many of these errors were subsequently corrected, but not before, they made lasting impressions on U.S. nuclear (and non-nuclear) policies. This was evident from the time the ‘Atoms for Peace’ program was first promulgated in 1953 to the 1970 establishment of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and more recently during the post-Cold War disarmament efforts and debates surrounding U.S. stance towards emerging nuclear threats. This study offers a brief survey of attempts to predict the future of nuclear weapons since the beginning of the Cold War.1 The aim of this analysis is not merely to review the record, but to provide an overall sense of how the nuclear future was perceived over the past six decades, and where and why errors were made in prediction, so that contemporary and future predictive efforts have the benefit of a clearer historical record. The survey is based on U.S. intelligence estimates as well as the voluminous scholarly work of American and foreign experts on the subject. Six broad lessons can be gleaned from this history. First, it reveals consistent misjudgments regarding the extent of nuclear proliferation. Overall, projections were far more pessimistic than actual developments; those emanating from independent experts more so than intelligence estimates. In the early years of the Cold War, the overly pessimistic projections stemmed, in part, from an incorrect emphasis on technology as the driving factor in horizontal proliferation, rather than intent, a misjudgment, which came to light with the advent of a Chinese bomb in 1964. The parallel shift from developed-world proliferation to developing-world proliferation was accompanied by greater alarm regarding the impact of proliferation. It was felt that developing countries were more dangerous and irresponsible nuclear states than developed countries. Second, while all the countries that did eventually develop nuclear weapons were on the lists of suspect states, the estimations misjudged when these countries would go nuclear. The Soviet Union went nuclear much earlier than had been initially predicted, intelligence estimates completely missed China’s nuclear progress, and India initially tested much later than U.S. intelligence projections had anticipated and subsequently declared nuclear weapon status in 1998 when virtually no one expected it to do so. Third, the pace of proliferation has been consistently slower than has been anticipated by most experts due to a combination of overwhelming alarmism, the intent of threshold states, and many incentives to abstain from weapons development. In the post-Cold War period, the number of suspected threshold states has gradually decreased and the geographical focus has shifted solely to North-East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. There is also much greater concern that a nuclear chain reaction will break out than was the case during the Cold War.

#### Nuke leadership fails – it’s an ineffective tool and outdated

Weiss 9 (Leonard, Affiliated Scholar – Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Reliable Energy Supply and Nonproliferation,” Nonproliferation Review, 16(2), July, http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/npr\_16-2\_weiss.pdf)

Part of the problem is that its value as a nonproliferation tool was at its height at the beginning of the nuclear age**,** when few countries were in a position to achieve nuclear autarky. The probability of consensus on establishing a worldwide regime in which there are fuel guarantees and no nationally owned fuel cycle facilities has been on a decreasing slope. Technology denial has become a less effective tool, thanks especially to A.Q. Khan and others. The spread of fuel cycle technologies has perhaps reached a tipping point in which the technology is**,** if not widely available, then sufficiently available to any determined party**.** Hence, the argument made by proponents of internationalization that giving up national nuclear development in favor of more restrictive international efforts will result in much greater security for all does not have the power it may once have had.

#### Alt cause – nuclear hypocrisy

**Caldicott, 6** – Founder and President of the Nuclear Policy Research Institute (Helen, “Nuclear Power is not the answer.” pp. 134-135)

In light of terrorist attacks using conventional weapons, it is only a matter of time before someone steals enough plutonium to make an adequate nuclear weapon. Then we proceed into the age of nuclear terrorism. Meanwhile, with the world awash in plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the Bush administration pursues its own nuclear armament development policy that makes it increasingly likely that a rogue nation will procure and possibly use nuclear weapons. The United States has adopted three contradictory stances at the same time: It is aggressively forging ahead to build more nuclear weapons, stating that it will use them preemptively even against non- nuclear nations. It is instrumental in denying the right to build nuclear weapons to all but a handful of countries. In the context of promoting nuclear energy, it has offered dozens of countries nuclear technology and access to nuclear power fuel. The fission process makes plutonium, which can then be separated by reprocessing and converted to fuel for nuclear weapons. While the Bush proposal includes taking the spent fuel back to the United States, it is not clear that that process can be undertaken with no cheating. Thus, even as there is much hand-wringing at the United Nations about the possibility that Iran and North Korea may be developing nuclear weapons, eight nation-states-Russia, the United States, France, China, Britain, India, Israel, and Pakistan- possess their own nuclear arsenals, and others are free to develop weapons without the admonitions that the United States and the United Nations are imposing upon Iran and North Korea. This strange juxtaposition of opposing attitudes needs to be examined in the context of the sixty-five-year history of nuclear fission and related weapons development.

#### Proliferation risk with SMRs – enables countries with high prolif risk to get nuclear energy

**Moor, 12** – Consultant in nuclear technology, licensing, and business structuring and former Director of Project Management at GPU Nuclear, Chair of the American Nuclear Society (ANS) President’s Special Committee on SMR Licensing Issues (Philip O, 5/9. “Small Modular Reactor Panel Discussion Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee.” Summary Prepared by Derek Updegraff, Rebecca Lordan, Pierce Corden Dirksen. http://cstsp.aaas.org/files/SummaryFinalSMR.pdf)

Moor also discussed one of the downsides of SMRs: The O&M costs are likely to be higher per MW than large reactors, unless new NRC regulations allow a reduction in staffing. However, additional costs for infrastructure would be avoided if SMR designs that mimic the larger LWRs were incorporated into the existing nuclear infrastructure. SMRs would use essentially the same fuel mixture and level of fuel enrichment (5% Uranium-­‐235) in fuel assemblies scaled to their size. The SMR designs that are designed to use higher enrichment (up to 20% for some designs) and longer fueling cycles would incur greater fuel costs. However, these models are not expected be competitive in the near term, both for reasons of infrastructure delay and concerns about proliferation.2 Proliferation is of particular concern in nations with lower security capacity and experience with nuclear materials. Since many of the nations who might accept SMRs for power generation fall into these categories, nonproliferation and materials safeguarding is paramount. One example Moor sited was Iran’s domestic enrichment to 20% — Iran could rationalize possessing highly enriched uranium if there were reactors that require it. However, if available technologies were using only low enriched uranium, it would be easier to decipher their intentions. To remedy these potential ambiguities, Moor said that a requirement could be to remove spent SMR fuel for disposal or reprocessing outside the country of concern.

#### Global Nuclear power growth is not inevitable- it is contingent upon US policies

**- Waterman ‘8** (Shaun Waterman, Washington (UPI), Jul 8, 2008, “Nuke Watchdog Warns About Nuclear Power And Proliferation Dangers Part One”, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Nuke\_Watchdog\_Warns\_About\_Nuclear\_Power\_And\_Proliferation\_Dangers\_Part\_One\_999.html, )

But critics challenge their premise, saying the idea that the growth of nuclear power generation is inevitable is a canard. **Many of those 435 reactors currently operating** **are due to be retired** in the next 20 to 30 years, points out Henry Sokolski, **a proliferation expert** who worked for Wolfowitz in the Bush I administration and currently sits alongside him on the congressionally mandated blue-ribbon panel examining the threat of terrorist attacks using nuclear material or other weapons of mass destruction. Nuclear energy is too expensive and too risky to be a commercially viable venture without government support, he told UPI. "There's a reason no one in the private sector wants to do this with their own money," Sokolski said. "Nuclear power is a hard sell, literally. ... What the (U.S.) nuclear industry is doing is asking for government handouts, in the form of tax credits, loan guarantees and insurance caps." Reprocessing is also not economically feasible without government financial support. "Working with plutonium requires special safety measures which are very expensive," Sokolski said. The idea that new technologies could help make generation or reprocessing economical is "atomic pie in the sky. The advances required are as far off as making fusion-generation practical, in terms of technology." **Expansion is "not inevitable, it is contingent" on U.S. policy changes**. "Maybe **nuclear power won't expand. It shrank by 2 percent last year,"** he said.

**New nuclear plants turn nuclear leadership**

**- Spencer ‘7** (Jack Spencer, Research Fellow in Nuclear Energy in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation, September 26, 2007, “The Nuclear Renaissance: Ten Principles to Guide U.S. Policy”, http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1640.cfm, [Ian Miller])

Nuclear power has many advantages over other power sources, but a global expansion of peaceful nuclear technology could present risks if not managed properly. While acting to mitigate these risks, U.S. policy should, as in other sectors, include pro-market regulatory reforms, foster competition, and avoid unnecessary intervention. The government will, however, have a more direct role in the nuclear sector than in most industries due to its history and the nature of the technology. Following the government-induced stagnation of the industry in the 1970s and 1980s, the private sector remains leery of making large investments without a clear sign that the government will not regulate the industry out of business again. To reap the benefits of nuclear power, while minimizing the risks, the United States must commit to reestablishing itself as a technology leader in commercial nuclear power, avoid unwanted foreign dependencies, modernize its approach to waste disposal, promote marketplace freedom, and modify its approach to nonproliferation. The 10 straightforward principles laid out in this paper should guide Congress and the Administration's actions.To the casual observer, nuclear energy is domestically produced. The plants exist in America, are generally operated by Americans, and generate electricity distributed to Americans. This is a narrow view, however; it does not respect the significance of the industrial and intellectual base that produces the people, components, and fuel necessary to build and operate nuclear plants. **After three decades of decline, the domestic industrial base does not have the capacity to produce the components for a single reactor.** This lack of capacity goes beyond items that are easily found on the international market. Essential components, such as heavy forgings (the enormous pieces of metal out of which components are manufactured) and specialized piping, are not available domestically and are in limited supply internationally. These industrial bottlenecks could be difficult to overcome as nuclear plant construction ramps up. Ultimately, there is little difference between **relying on** foreign oil or **foreign manufacturing** if both **allow America's ability to produce energy to be disrupted by foreign interests. This reliance creates opportunities for others to exercise power over the U.S.** Minimizing these leverage points is central to advancing national interests. The Administration and Congress must avoid the potential vulnerabilities and risks associated with foreign energy dependence. 2. Establish technological leadership across the spectrum of military, civilian, and commercial nuclear activities. The international influx of investment to the commercial nuclear sector (public and private) almost **guarantees that more advanced nuclear technologies**, some of **which could threaten the United States,** **will become available to unfriendly actors.** Preventing this requires that the U.S. and its allies establish technological superiority across the spectrum of nuclear activities. **Close links among civil, commercial, and military nuclear technologies will assure that those nations with the most advanced commercial and industrial capabilities are able to develop the most advanced military technologies**. Therefore, it is vitally important that America's nuclear industrial base, along with that of its close allies, both commercial and military, remain globally preeminent. 3. Assure access to the components, capabilities, and materials necessary to build, operate, and maintain America's nuclear power plants. Several critical sectors of the nuclear industry will have to be strengthened to support a near-term, sustained effort to expand America's commercial nuclear industry. For example, **the very large forgings needed to build reactors are available only in Japan**, which can provide parts for only seven or eight reactors annually. This is not adequate to sustain a broad nuclear renaissance. Only one U.S. company today can take those forgings and manufacture them into the components used to build reactors. Other choke points may include the capacity to manufacture steam generators and specialized piping. Even if there were additional manufacturers, there are too few skilled technicians, boilermakers, pipe fitters, electricians, and ironworkers to support the effort. Supplies of raw materials must also be secured. Global capacity could be enough to support the near-term expansion of America's nuclear power industry, but problems will arise as other nations expand their nuclear industries simultaneously. **This will seriously stress the current infrastructure and challenge America's ability to meet its energy needs**. 4. Promote free trade as a central tenet of the global nuclear industry. The nuclear marketplace is often understood to be global, but this is not exactly true. Though the U.S. market is certainly international, with companies from around the world—many state owned and subsidized—doing business in the United States, most states control foreign access to their markets. American companies are effectively barred from most countries' markets through a combination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, bureaucracy, protectionism, and onerous liability regimes. This is becoming a significant issue as major manufacturing countries like China and India and parts of Europe are developing plans to expand their commercial nuclear capabilities. Gaining access to these markets will be crucial to the long-term health of America's domestic nuclear industrial base. 5. Limit subsidies to the commercial nuclear industry. The federal government has a critical role to play in the initial phases of the American nuclear rebirth, but this role must be finite. Many countries are choosing to consolidate control over their nuclear industries to protect their strategic and economic interests. This approach may seem attractive in the near-term—it allows these industrial titans to underbid competition, minimize risk calculations, and enjoy market preferences—but it will undoubtedly leave those industries worse off in the long-term. Congress and the Administration must resist efforts to rebuild America's commercial nuclear industry through long-term federal support. While some near-term incentives may be appropriate, given the government's part in inducing the current atrophy of the nuclear industrial base, industry must not become dependent on subsidies. An American industry that grows out of the free market will be stronger over the long term. Furthermore, a competitive, market-driven U.S. industry will provide critical competition to the state-owned and state-supported companies that currently lead the commercial sector. Strong competition will force these nationalized and quasi-nationalized industries to maintain high quality standards. Quality assurance is critical to the success of nuclear energy, because an accident at one facility could negatively impact the entire industry.

#### No Domino effect

**Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2008**

[William C. and Gaukhar**, \*** Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and \*\* Research Associate at the James Martin Center, **“**Divining Nuclear Intentions: a review essay.” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 139–169, Google scholar]

Today it is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to and one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and tipping points.42 The lead author of this essay also has been guilty of the same tendency, and initially named an ongoing research project on forecasting proliferation he directs “21st Century Nuclear Proliferation Chains and Trigger Events.” As both a thors proceeded with research on the project, however, and particularly after reading the books by Hymans and Solingen, we became convinced that the metaphor is inappropriate and misleading, as it implies a process of nuclear decisionmaking and a pace of nuclear weapons spread that are unlikely to transpire. The current alarm about life in a nuclear-armed crowd has many historical antecedents and can be found in classified National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) as well as in scholarly analyses. The 1957 NIE, for example, identified a list of ten leading nuclear weapons candidates, including Canada, Japan, and Sweden.43 Sweden, it predicted, was “likely to produce its first weapons in about 1961,” while it was estimated that Japan would “probably seek to de- velop weapons production programs within the next decade.”44 In one of the most famous forecasts, President John Kennedy in 1963 expressed a nightmarish vision of a future world with afteen, twenty, or twenty-ave nuclear weap- ons powers.45 A number of the earliest scholarly projections of proliferation also tended to exaggerate the pace of nuclear weapons spread. A ourry of studies between 1958 and 1962, for example, focused on the “Ninth Country Problem” and identified as many as twelve candidates capable of going nuclear in the near future.46 Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland were among the states most frequently picked as near-term proliferators. The “peaceful nuclear explosion” by India in 1974 was seen by many ana- lysts of the time as a body blow to the young NPT that would set in motion a new wave of proliferation. Although the anticipated domino effect did not transpire, the Indian test did precipitate a marked increase in scholarship on proliferation, including an innovative study developed around the concept— now in vogue—of proliferation chains. Rarely cited by today’s experts, the 1976 monograph on Trends in Nuclear Proliferation, 1975–1995, by Lewis Dunn and Herman Kahn, set forth fifteen scenarios for nuclear weapons spread, each based on the assumption that one state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would prompt several other states to follow suit, which in turn would trigger a succession of additional nuclearization decisions.47 Although lacking any single theoretical underpinning and accepting of the notion that proliferation de- cisions are likely to be attributed to security needs, the Dunn-Kahn model rejected the exclusive focus by realists on security drivers and sought to probe beneath the rhetoric to identify the possible presence of other pressures and constraints. To their credit, Dunn and Kahn got many things right and advanced the study of proliferation. Their forecasts, however, were almost without excep- tion wildly off the mark. Why, one may inquire, were their pessimistic projec- tions about nuclear weapons spread—and those of their past and subsequent counterparts in the intelligence community—so often divorced from reality? Although Hymans and Solingen appear not to have been familiar with the re- search by Dunn and Kahn on proliferation trends at the time of their books’ publications, their national leadership and domestic political survival models offer considerable insight into that dimension of the proliferation puzzle.48

### 1NC – Solvency

#### Natural gas blocks

**Biello 12** (David, Associate Editor at Scientific American, March 27, "Small Reactors Make a Bid to Revive Nuclear Power", <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=small-reactors-bid-to-revive-nuclear-power>)

Regardless of how cheap such Small Modular Reactors may allow nuclear to be in future, it is unlikely to be as cheap as natural-gas-fired turbines in the present. In fact, low natural gas prices stalled the U.S. nuclear renaissance outside Georgia and South Carolina, long before the reactor meltdowns at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan. "Because of an unanticipated abundance of natural gas in the United States, nuclear energy, in general, is facing tough competition," noted an analysis of the prospects for small modular reactors from the University of Chicago published last November. The analysis also suggested that small reactors would be more expensive than large reactors on a per-megawatt basis until manufacturing in significant quantities has happened. "It [is] unlikely that SMRs will be commercialized without some form of government incentive." But the Department of Energy funding may only support two designs. Innovation spurred by competition seems unlikely. And that may ultimately erode the current U.S. nuclear industry advantage—from design to operation to regulation.

#### **Military nuclear installments will be targeted for sabotage – causes accidents**

Wong 12 (Kelvin, Associate Research Fellow – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, “Beyond Weapons: The Military’s Quest For Nuclear Power – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 5-22, http://www.eurasiareview.com/22052012-beyond-weapons-the-militarys-quest-for-nuclear-power-analysis/)

Civilian And Military Nuclear Incidents Despite improvements in nuclear safety, public sentiment on nuclear power is generally unfavourable, particularly after a series of high-profile nuclear incidents over the years. Disasters like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the recent Fukushima episodes have sorely demonstrated the perils of operating nuclear reactors, emanating be it from human error or natural calamities. Military forces have also been stung by peacetime nuclear incidents. In March 2008, the American nuclear submarine USS Houston leaked minute amounts of radiation into Sasebo naval base while on a port call, triggering condemnation from Japanese citizens in the district. In the same year, the British nuclear submarine HMS Trafalgar leaked hundreds of litres of radioactive wastewater into a nearby river while docked at Devonport naval base, raising concerns from nuclear safety experts. Mainstream Nuclear Power In The Military? Yet military scientists have not ceased to be tempted by the potential of nuclear power. In response to increasing oil prices and global supply uncertainties, and well-documented cases of logistical strain on forces operating in the Middle East in recent conflicts, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) issued a proposal for innovative solutions in deployable compact nuclear reactors in 2010. In the proposal, DARPA outlined the need to reduce the logistical burden of supplying forward operating bases and forces without access to reliable fuel supply lines. The proposal also suggested that materials science have advanced to the stage where it might have a positive impact on deployable nuclear reactor research. While recent developments suggest that nuclear power technology can potentially be employed in unmanned aircraft and on the ground, it is unlikely to have mainstream military utility. The Cold War period was an era when general attitudes towards nuclear energy were quite favourable, and military experimentation was only limited by funding and scientific expertise. In contrast, nuclear power today has become a hotly debated issue despite its importance in powering the economies of advanced nations today. For the military, the problem with nuclear power is not just about cost and safety, but also of the nature of its operating environment. Deploying volatile nuclear reactors into harm’s way on the battlefield, where their destruction and sabotage are likely, should give military planners cause to pause.

#### Extinction

**Caldicott 94** (Helen, Australian Physician, Nuclear Madness, p. 21)

As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology **threatens life on our planet with extinction.** If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to post a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced. Unknowingly exposed to these radioactive poisons, some of us may be developing cancer right now. Others may be passing damaged genes, the basic chemical units that transmit hereditary characteristics, to future generations. And more of us will inevitably be affected unless we bring about a dramatic reversal of the world’s pronuclear policies

#### Turn – military SMRs cause prolif

Smith 11 (Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy – CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2-16, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)

What are the alternatives to small nuclear reactors (assuming we want to maintain a large oversees military presence)? The NDU report makes the point that the DoD has already been experimenting with “an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels.” But, according to the report, “unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD’s reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas.” While, to my knowledge, the DoD has not seen any huge relief from what I would call its token attempts at ‘going green,’ it hardly writes off the possibility of alternative energy supplies short of going nuclear. The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid. I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says, Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors. The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.” These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.” On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.” Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern. The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps. The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.”My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.

#### Long timeframe to deployment

**ITA, 11** – International Trade Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce, February. Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report. “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf)

Although SMRs have significant potential and the market for their deployment is growing, their designs must still go through the technical and regulatory processes necessary to ensure that they can be safely and securely deployed. Lightwater technology–based SMRs may not be ready for deployment in the United States for at least a decade, and advanced designs might be even further off. Light-water SMRs and SMRs that have undergone significant testing are the most likely candidates for near-term deployment, because they are most similar to existing reactors that have certified designs and significant operating histories. NuScale is on track to submit its reactor design to the NRC by 2012, as is Babcock & Wilcox for its mPower design. In addition, GE-Hitachi, which already completed an NRC preapplication review for its PRISM reactor in 1994, plans to submit its PRISM design for certification in 2012.

#### No Expertise

Parthemore and Rogers 10 (Christine and Will, Bacevich Fellow – CNAS, “Nuclear Reactors on Military Bases May Be Risky,” Center for a New American Security, 5-20, http://www.cnas.org/node/4502)

The media have reported that Tennessee Sen. Lamar Alexander (R) is proposing a joint Department of Energy/Department of Defense demonstration project to examine the use of small reactors on federal sites. For some Department of Energy sites, such as Oak Ridge National Lab in Alexander’s home state — a site certainly accustomed to housing nuclear technology — demonstrating new nuclear reactor technology is largely a no-brainer. However, using nuclear reactors to power the nation’s defense installations warrants deeper consideration. Proponents of boosting this carbon-free energy source on military bases argue that these installations have unique capacities that would ease concerns over its use, namely more gates and more armed guards already on base 24/7. Likewise, the U.S. military services have unique energy security needs. Consistent energy supplies are a critical component of America’s ability to train at home and to operate globally. Energy is so important that some analysts are even exploring “islanding” the energy systems on some military installations to reduce vulnerabilities related to their reliance on often brittle domestic electric grids. Consideration of nuclear energy as part of these islanding concepts is on the rise. On the other hand, opponents contend that sufficient numbers of military base personnel may not have the requisite training in nuclear reactor management, oversight and regulatory credentials to attend to reactors in the round-the-clock manner necessary. In most cases, additional qualified personnel and improved physical security and safety requirements would be needed. As with all nuclear power generation, materials proliferation, water usage, radioactive waste management and public opinion will also be major concerns. Most military bases also strive to be integrated into their surrounding communities, and, by our experience, many base officials consider integrated electric infrastructure an important point of connection between local and military needs. Concepts for nuclear energy generation solely to supply military bases must be sensitive to what public perceptions could be in the event of extended blackouts for surrounding communities. Any legislation to consider the option of small nuclear reactors on military bases must include examination of these important concerns.

#### DoD doesn’t drive the domestic market

Dimotakis 6 (Paul Dimotakis, The MITRE Corporation, 2006, December 09, 2006, Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf)

The 2006 DoD fossil-fuel budget is, approximately, 2.5-3% of the national-defense budget, the range dependent on what is chosen as the total national-defense budget. iv Larger (percentage) fuel costs are borne by families and many businesses, for example, and fuel costs have only relatively recently become noticeable to the DoD. 3. At present, there is a large spread between oil-production cost and crude-oil prices. Many projections, however, including that of the U.S. Energy Information Agency, indicate that crude oil prices may well decrease to $40-$50/barrel within the next few years, as production and refining capacity increases to match demand. 4. DoD is not a sufficiently large customer to drive the domestic market for demand and consumption of fossil fuel alternatives, or to drive fuel and transportation technology developments, in general. Barring externalities, e.g., subsidies, governmental and departmental directives, etc., non-fossil-derived fuels are not likely to play a significant role in the next 25 years. 5. DoD fuel consumption constraints and patterns of use do not align well with those of the commercial sector. Most commercial-sector fuel use, for example, is in ground transportation, with only 4% of domestic petroleum consumption used for aviation. In contrast, almost 60% of DoD fuel use is by the Air Force, with additional fuel used in DoD aviation if Naval aviation consumption is included. Options for refueling ships at sea are more limited (or nonexistent) compared to those for commercial vehicles in urban areas. Options for DoD use of electrical energy on ground vehicles are limited, since one can not expect to plug into the grid in hostile territory, for example, to refuel/recharge an electric vehicle. Furthermore, drive cycles for DoD ground vehicles differ significantly from EPA drive cycles that, as a consequence, provide poor standards for fuel consumption.

**Deterrence**

**The nuclear arsenal will be modernized now – but risks cuts from the defense budget**

**Washington Post, 9/15**/12 (Dana Priest, “Aging U.S. nuclear arsenal slated for costly and long-delayed modernization,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-nuclear-arsenal-is-ready-for-overhaul/2012/09/15/428237de-f830-11e1-8253-3f495ae70650_story.html>)

The U.S. nuclear arsenal, the most powerful but indiscriminate class of weapons ever created, is set to undergo the costliest overhaul in its history, even as the military faces spending cuts to its conventional arms programs at a time of fiscal crisis.¶ For two decades, U.S. administrations have confronted the decrepit, neglected state of the aging nuclear weapons complex. Yet officials have repeatedly put off sinking huge sums into projects that receive little public recognition, driving up the costs even further.¶ Now, as the nation struggles to emerge from the worst recession of the postwar era and Congress faces an end-of-year deadline to avoid $1.2 trillion in automatic cuts to the federal budget over 10 years, the Obama administration is overseeing the gargantuan task of modernizing the nuclear arsenal to keep it safe and reliable.

**The aff causes DoD budget tradeoffs**

**Snider, 12** – reporter for E&E (Annie, 2/23, “Military’s alt energy programs draw Republicans’ ire,” <http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/02/23/2>)

The idea that the administration is using DOD as a more politically palatable vehicle for renewable energy investments is now reverberating across Capitol Hill, even as Pentagon officials flatly deny the allegations.¶ At a budget hearing last week, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus, the department's most high-profile alternative energy advocate, took volley after volley from Republicans on the House Armed Services Committee. They said that his priorities were misplaced, argued that spending on clean energy was **taking money out of more important missions** and hinted at a link between the Pentagon's green efforts and the prominence of former Silicon Valley clean-tech investors within the Obama administration.¶ "You're not the secretary of the energy, you're the secretary of the Navy," said Rep. Randy Forbes (R-Va.), who leads the subcommittee with jurisdiction over military energy and environment issues.¶ Prime among the lawmakers' complaints was that the military is paying a higher price for some forms of alternative energy at a time when DOD proposes cutting weapons programs and reducing forces in order to meet budget mandates.

**Nuclear modernization will be the first to be cut – it’s on the chopping block – that destroys deterrence**

**Trachtenberg, 11** – president and CEO of Shortwaver Consulting, LLC, former principal deputy assistant secretary of defense (international security policy), acting deputy assistant secretary of defense (forces policy), and head of the policy staff of the House Armed Services Committee (David J, 10/1. “Nuclear Fallback.” ,” [http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279610/nuclear-fallback-david-j-trachtenberg#](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279610/nuclear-fallback-david-j-trachtenberg))

Political turmoil in the Middle East, Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons, and the buildup of China’s military are only a few of the worrisome trends that point to a prolonged period of global instability. Against this backdrop, the U.S. defense budget and the military capabilities it buys are being dramatically reduced in ways that will hinder our ability to shape or respond to these developments.¶ Over the next decade, defense spending will drop by anywhere from $450 billion to more than $1 trillion. The full extent of the cuts, and the national-security implications they foreshadow, are now in the hands of a congressional “supercommittee” charged with slashing overall federal spending. But cuts of this magnitude will translate into less military capability, a likely “dumbing down” of U.S. military strategy, a more problematic margin of military advantage over potential adversaries, and greater strategic risk. They are also likely to diminish America’s ability to advance U.S. policy objectives and secure a stable world order.¶ Not surprisingly, long-overdue investments in our aging and deteriorating nuclear capabilities and infrastructure — essential to maintaining a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent — are now **on the chopping block** as the military services seek to protect “usable” non-nuclear systems at the expense of “unusable” nuclear ones.¶ But the world remains a dangerous place, with nations and groups seeking nuclear weapons as a counter to U.S. military preponderance, a deterrent to U.S. action in regions vital to American national-security interests, a bargaining chip for political leverage, or a counter to regional threats. Nuclear weapons remain the great equalizer in world affairs, granting those that possess them greater influence over American policies and actions. Consequently, an effective and robust U.S. nuclear deterrent remains as important as ever.

**Probability -- conflict now is highly likely given other economic stressors**

**Mootry 9** (Primus, B.A. Northern Illinois University “Americans likely to face more difficult times” - The Herald Bulletin, http://www.theheraldbulletin.com/columns/local\_story\_282184703.html?keyword=secondarystory)

These are difficult times. The direct and indirect costs associated with the war on Iraq have nearly wrecked our economy. The recent $700 billion bailout, bank failures, and the failure of many small and large businesses across the nation will take years — perhaps decades — to surmount. Along with these rampant business failures, we have seen unemployment rates skyrocket, record numbers of home foreclosures, an explosion of uninsured Americans, and other economic woes that together have politicians now openly willing to mention the "D" word: Depression. These are difficult days. We have seen our international reputation sink to all time lows. We have seen great natural disasters such as hurricanes Ike and Katrina leaving hundreds of thousands of citizens stripped of all they own or permanently dislocated. In all my years, I have never seen a time such as this. To make matters worse, we are witnessing a resurgence of animosities between the United States and Russia, as well as the rapid growth of India and China. As to the growth of these two huge countries, the problem for us is that they are demanding more and more oil — millions of barrels more each week — and there is not much we can say or do about it. In the meantime, if America does not get the oil it needs, our entire economy will grind to a halt. In short, the challenges we face are complex and enormous. Incidentally, one of the factors that makes this time unlike any other in history is the **potential for worldwide nuclear conflict**. **There has never been a time in** the long **history** of man **when**, through his own technologies — and his arrogance — he can destroy the planet. Given the tensions around the world, **a mere spark could lead to global conflagration.**[This evidence has been gender paraphrased].

**Econ decline tanks nuke power – undermines necessary investment**

**Simpson 9** (Fiona, associate director of New York University's Center on International Cooperation, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, "The recession alone won't stop nuclear power's growth," http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-recession-alone-wont-stop-nuclear-powers-growth)

None of the IAEA's projections, however, account for the financial crisis, which may negatively impact the appeal of nuclear energy. Clearly, investors that need credit to build new nuclear plants face a great deal more uncertainty and difficulty securing financing. Such a situation, on the surface, would indicate that nuclear power **will be less attractive to investors.** The downturn also may reduce electricity demand and thus, potentially, **make the need for new power plants less urgen**t.¶ At the same time, prices for natural gas and oil have fallen from earlier highs, increasing their attractiveness as energy sources (although the price of each has increased recently). Additionally, nuclear power plants have significant "front-loaded" costs, requiring much more investment at the outset than fossil-fuel burning plants, even if nuclear plants may eventually be cheaper to run. In light of the ongoing credit crunch, investors in countries that don't rely on state-owned enterprises may find the economic circumstances **simply too difficult to justify** an investment in nuclear power--especially if there's reliable (and domestic) access to natural gas, coal, or oil. One also would expect private lenders to shy from nuclear projects--both because they have less money to lend and because of nuclear power's history of cost overruns and delays. Finally, from the point of view of developing countries interested in nuclear power, multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, tend to prohibit investment in new nuclear projects.

**Growth Good – Proliferation**

**Growth solves prolif – multiple reasons**

**Singh and Way 4** (Sonali, VP Product of Advanced Software Design – Bain and Company, and Christopher, Assistant Professor of Government – Cornell University, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48(6), December, p.864-865)

Turning from political regime type to economic policies switches the emphasis to the economic component of domestic liberalization in reducing the appeal of nuclear weapons. According to Solingen (1994, 1998), ruling coalitions pursuing liberal economic policies are more likely to join regional nuclear nonproliferation regimes than inward-looking nationalist and radical-confessional governments; liberalizing coalitions trade away the opportunity to make the bomb for the opportunity to make money, perceiving little benefit from maintaining an ambiguous stance. In a similar vein, Paul (2000) argues that as the benefits of economic integration and interdependence rise, states will **forgo highly sensitive activities**, such as nuclear acquisition, which might generate uncertainty, negative repercussions, and heightened international tensions. As the cost of placing trading and investment ties at risk increases, states will become more cautious about pursing nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear Power – 2NC**

**Group the link debate –**

**DoD acquisition of SMR’s ensures rapid military adoption and commercialization**

**Andres and Breetz 11** [Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)]

Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, **failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD,** which we review in this section: first, **small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the U**nited **S**tates; second, **the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs**; and third, **expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries**. **By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications.** The “Valley of Death Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, **DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production**. However, **if DOD does not provide an initial** demonstration and **market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground**. **The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley of Death.”** **Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures**— **including technical and financial uncertainties**, information asymmetries, **capital market imperfections, transaction costs**, and environmental and security externalities— **that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace**. 28 In such cases, **the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability**.29 [FOOTNOTE 29: **There are** numerous **actions that the Federal Government could take**, such as conducting or funding research and development, stimulating private investment, demonstrating technology, mandating adoption, and guaranteeing markets. **Military procurement** is thus only one option, but it has often **played a decisive role in technology development and is likely to be the catalyst for the U.S. small reactor industry.** See Vernon W. Ruttan, Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Kira R. Fabrizio and David C. Mowery, “The Federal Role in Financing Major Inventions: Information Technology during the Postwar Period,” in Financing Innovation in the United States, 1870 to the Present, ed. Naomi R. Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 283–316.] Historically, **nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military** and defense related **procurement would not have been developed at all.”**30 **Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology** as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative **designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs**.”31 In addition, **M**assachusetts **I**nstitute of **T**echnology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power **called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance**, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, **given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now.** Technological Lock-in. **A second risk is that if small reactors do reach the market without DOD assistance, the designs that succeed may not be optimal for DOD’s applications**. **Due to a variety of positive feedback and increasing returns to adoption** (including demonstration effects, technological interdependence, network and learning effects, and economies of scale), **the designs that are initially developed can become “locked in.”**34 **Competing designs**—even if they are superior in some respects or better for certain market segments— **can face barriers to entry that lock them out of the market. If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred designs are not locked out, then it should take a first mover role on small reactors.** It is far too early to gauge whether the private market and DOD have aligned interests in reactor designs. On one hand, Matthew Bunn and Martin Malin argue that what the world needs is cheaper, safer, more secure, and more proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors; presumably, many of the same broad qualities would be favored by DOD.35 **There are many varied market niches that could be filled by small reactors, because there are many different applications** and settings in which they can be used, and it is quite possible that some of those niches will be compatible with DOD’s interests.36 On the other hand, **DOD may have specific needs** (transportability, for instance) **that would not be a high priority for any other market segment.** Moreover, while DOD has unique technical and organizational capabilities that could enable it to pursue more radically innovative reactor lines, DOE has indicated that it will focus its initial small reactor deployment efforts on LWR designs.37 **If DOD wants to ensure that its preferred reactors are developed and available in the future, it should take a leadership role now. Taking a first mover role does not** necessarily **mean that DOD would be “picking a winner” among small reactors**, as **the market will probably pursue multiple types of small reactors. Nevertheless, DOD leadership would likely have a profound effect on the industry’s timeline and trajectory.** Domestic Nuclear Expertise. From the perspective of larger national security issues, **if DOD does not catalyze the small reactor industry, there is a risk that expertise in small reactors could become dominated by foreign companies**. A 2008 Defense Intelligence Agency report warned that the United States will become totally dependent on foreign governments for future commercial nuclear power unless the military acts as the prime mover to reinvigorate this critical energy technology with small, distributed power reactors.38 **Several of the most prominent small reactor concepts rely on technologies perfected at Federally funded laboratories and research programs**, including the Hyperion Power Module (Los Alamos National Laboratory), NuScale (DOE-sponsored research at Oregon State University), IRIS (initiated as a DOE-sponsored project), Small and Transportable Reactor (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), and Small, Sealed, Transportable, Autonomous Reactor (developed by a team including the Argonne, Lawrence Livermore, and Los Alamos National Laboratories). **However, there are scores of competing designs under development from over a dozen countries. If DOD does not act early to support the U.S. small reactor industry, there is a chance that the industry could be dominated by foreign companies**. Along with other negative consequences, **the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry decreases the NRC’s influence on the technology that supplies the world’s rapidly expanding demand for nuclear energy. Unless U.S. companies begin to retake global market share, in coming decades France, China, South Korea, and Russia will dictate standards on nuclear reactor reliability, performance, and proliferation resistance**.

**the industry and determining optimal configurations – licensing is not a problem**

**Madia 12** (William Madia, Stanford Energy Journal, Dr. Madia serves as Chairman of the Board of Overseers and Vice President for the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford University. Previously, he was the Laboratory Director at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory from 2000-2004 and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory from 1994-1999., “SMALL MODULAR REACTORS: A POTENTIAL GAME-CHANGING TECHNOLOGY”, <http://energyclub.stanford.edu/index.php/Journal/Small_Modular_Reactors_by_William_Madia>, Spring 2012)

**The drivers that caused the industry to build bigger and bigger NPPs are being offset today by various considerations that make this new breed of SMRs viable**. **Factory manufacturing is one of these considerations**. Most **SMRs are small enough to allow them to be factory built and shipped by rail or barge to the power plant sites**. **Numerous industry “rules of thumb” for factory manufacturing show dramatic savings as compared to “on-site” outdoor building methods**. Significant schedule advantages are also available because weather delay considerations are reduced. Of course, from a total cost perspective, some of these savings will be offset by the capital costs associated with building multiple modules to get the same total power output. Based on analyses I have seen, overnight costs in the range of $5000 to $8000 per installed kilowatt are achievable**. If these analyses are correct, it means that the economies of scale arguments that drove current designs to GW scales could be countered by the simplicity and factory-build possibilities of SMRs.** **No one has yet obtained a design certification from the** Nuclear Regulatory Commission (**NRC**) for an SMR, so we must consider licensing to be one of the largest unknowns facing these new designs. **Nevertheless, since the most developed of the SMRs are mostly based on proven and licensed components and are configured at power levels that are passively safe**, **we should not expect many new significant licensing issues to be raised for this class of reactor.** Still, the NRC will need to address issues uniquely associated with SMRs, such as the number of reactor modules any one reactor operator can safely operate and the size of the emergency planning zone for SMRs. **To determine if SMRs hold the potential for changing the game in carbon-free power generation,** **it is imperative that we test the design, engineering, licensing, and economic assumptions with some sort of public-private development and demonstration program**. **Instead of having government simply invest in research and development to “buy down” the risks** associated with SMRs, I propose a more novel approach. **Since the federal government is a major power consumer, it should commit to being the “first mover” of SMRs**. **This means purchasing the first few hundred MWs of SMR generation capacity and dedicating it to federal use**. The advantages of this approach are straightforward. **The government would both reduce licensing and economic risks to the point where utilities might invest in subsequent units**, thus **jumpstarting the SMR industry**. **It would then** **also be the recipient of additional carbon-free energy generation capacity**. This seems like a very sensible role for government to play without getting into the heavy politics of nuclear waste, corporate welfare, or carbon taxes. **If we want to deploy power generation technologies that can realize near-term impact on carbon emissions safely**, reliably, economically, at scale, and at total costs that are manageable on the balance sheets of most utilities, **we must consider SMRs as a key component of our national energy strategy.**

**Link turn – nuclear power keeps prices down.**

**Cunningham - October 2012** ("Small Modular Reactors: A Possible Path Forward for Nuclear Power", by Nick Cunningham, http://americansecurityproject.org/ASP%20Reports/Ref%200087%20-%20Small%20Modular%20Reactors.pdf - accessed 10/20/12) kc

Third, nuclear power serves as a hedge against the price volatility of fossil fuels. While dramatic declines in ¶ wellhead prices for natural gas have led to it capturing an increasing share of the market in recent years, natural ¶ gas prices have historically been extremely volatile. Additionally, with the prospect of a price being levied on ¶ carbon-based fuels in the coming years, nuclear power can ensure cheap and reliable power for decades. ¶ Finally, the rapid increase in demand for electricity around the world over the next several decades presents the ¶ U.S. with a huge opportunity to create jobs through exporting nuclear technology. Demand for nuc

**Link outweighs the link turn – even failed projects jack up the price**

**Madsen et al 9** (Travis, Analyst @ Frontier Group and Maryland PIRG Foundation, Johanna Neumann @ Maryland PIRG Foundation, and Emily Rusch @ CalPIRG Education Fund, "The High Cost of Nuclear Power," http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/calvert/highcostnpower\_mdpirg.pdf)

N o power company has successfully ¶ ordered a nuclear reactor in the ¶ United States since 1973. Despite¶ promises of power that would be “too ¶ cheap to meter,” the last generation of ¶ nuclear **reactors ran aground on skyrocketing construction costs**. Of 75 nuclear¶ reactors completed between 1966 and¶ 1986, the average reactor cost more than¶ triple its original construction budget.¶ 1¶ Later-built reactors came in as much ¶ as 1,200 percent over-budget.¶ 2¶ In 1985,¶ Forbes magazine wrote that “the failure ¶ of the U.S. nuclear power program ranks ¶ as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental ¶ scale.”¶ 3¶ **Electricity customers ended up paying¶ the price**. Only one-half of the reactors¶ proposed were ever built, and ratepayers ¶ often had to bear the costs of abandoned ¶ projects. **Where reactor projects were¶ completed, rates often increased**. Finally,¶ during the restructuring of the electricity ¶ industry in the 1990s, ratepayers were¶ saddled with billions in “stranded costs” ¶ from failed investments in nuclear power, ¶ saving nuclear power plant owners (and¶ their shareholders) from huge losses.

**Nuclear power triples the cost that consumers pay**

**Madsen et al 9** (Travis, Analyst @ Frontier Group and Maryland PIRG Foundation, Johanna Neumann @ Maryland PIRG Foundation, and Emily Rusch @ CalPIRG Education Fund, "The High Cost of Nuclear Power," http://www.nirs.org/nukerelapse/calvert/highcostnpower\_mdpirg.pdf)

Compounding the problem are the¶ high cost estimates for new nuclear ¶ reactors. Some estimates of the cost of ¶ power from a new nuclear reactor range ¶ as high as 25 to 30 cents per kWh –¶ **triple electricity rates in most parts of ¶ the country**.¶ 57¶ Adding power at even half ¶ this price to a service territory **could ¶ increase the cost that consumers pay for ¶ electricity,** motivating additional efforts ¶ to conserve and dampening the power ¶ demand the plant was built to serve.¶ This exact situation contributed to ¶ the failure of the last wave of nuclear ¶ power plant construction in the United ¶ States. Dozens of reactors were cancelled, and billions of dollars in unnecessary investment were lost.

**Nuclear power displaces the low prices of natural gas – causes spikes in consumers rate**

**Niemeyer** 3/6/**12** (Kyle, science writer for Ars Technica. He has B.S. and M.S. degrees in Aerospace Engineering from Case Western Reserve University, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate focusing on combustion modeling, "Chain reaction: the (slow) revival of US nuclear power," http://arstechnica.com/science/2012/03/chain-reaction-the-slow-revival-of-us-nuclear-power/)

Proponents for greater use of nuclear power often tout its low cost and zero emissions. According to the US Energy Information Administration, electricity from nuclear power will cost 11.39 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) in 2016. By comparison, conventional coal plants would generate electricity **at 9.5 cents** per kWh **and onshore wind at 9.7 cents** per kWh. Advanced natural gas plants offer by far the lowest cost **at 6.6 cents** per kWh.¶ However, it isn’t the cost of electricity that’s the problem. The largest barrier to more nuclear power plants may be the initial cost of construction. According to the report, the capital cost of nuclear plants always escalated over original estimates. The final costs of plants built through 1980—meaning all of them, since only one has been built since 1978—were on average 50 percent higher than comparable coal plants. This even includes retrofits to the coal plants to meet the higher emissions standards of the Clean Air Act.¶ Comparison of electricity costs from nuclear, coal, and gas from different studies.¶ Wikimedia Commons¶ Cost escalation remains an issue. A group of companies announced a two-reactor project in Texas in 2006, with an estimated cost of $5.2 billion. Three years later, the cost was revised to $10 billion, then $13 billion a few weeks later. The final estimate eventually reached $18.2 billion, over three times the original estimate. That's more expensive than an equivalently-sized natural gas plants, which also wouldn’t take nearly as long to build.¶ Considering the increasingly low price of electricity from natural gas, the report emphasized the need for some sort of carbon pricing to make nuclear attractive. Natural gas power plants are beginning to replace coal plants and they emit about half the greenhouse gases. Without a price on carbon dioxide emissions, **nuclear power is actually more expensive than coal, oil, or natural gas**, due to the massive upfront cost.

**Uniqueness Wall – 2NC**

**1. Reduced demand, transmission infrastructure saturation, EIA projections**

**SF Gate 10/12/12** ("Electric Power Transmission in the US Industry Market Reserach Report Now Available from IBISWorld," Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/business/prweb/article/Electric-Power-Transmission-in-the-US-Industry-3942031.php#ixzz29hR9EKm6)

Electricity consumption slowed during the recession as nearly all downstream customers cut back expenditures. According to Federal Reserve estimates, manufacturers increasingly idled production facilities over the past five years, resulting in lower industrial electricity consumption. According to Yang, “Furthermore, the EIA estimates that households have increasingly adopted energy-efficient appliances, causing overall household consumption to slightly decrease.” And in the commercial sector, many operations closed, dragging down demand for power. In addition, electricity price growth has also slowed as transmission infrastructure became increasingly saturated over the past five years. Market saturation often occurs because PUCs generally grant higher rate increases to utilities that invest in transmission infrastructure. **The EIA expects both electricity consumption and electricity prices to fall in 2012.** Consequently, IBISWorld estimates that industry revenue will decline 2.4% over the year.

**2. Multiple indicators prove**

**Fahey 10/10/12** (Jonathan, Huff Post, "Heating costs to rise this winter as cold returns," http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121010/us-winter-heating-costs/)

Prices for natural gas, heating oil and other fuels will be **relatively stable**. But customers will have to use more energy to keep warm than they did a year ago, according to the annual Winter Fuels Outlook from the Energy Department's Energy Information Administration.¶ Last winter was the warmest on record. This year temperatures are expected to be close to normal.¶ Heating bills will rise 20 percent for heating oil customers, 15 percent for natural gas customers, 13 percent for propane customers and 5 percent for electricity customers, the EIA announced Wednesday.¶ Heating oil customers are expected to pay an average of $3.80 per gallon, the highest price ever. That will result in record heating bills, at an average of $2,494. That's nearly $200 more than the previous high, set in the winter of 2010-2011.¶ Kathleen Ryan of Cohoes, in upstate New York, is on a payment plan in which she is billed for oil November through May to spread out the costs. But with oil prices high and a hint of winter chill in the air, she is concerned.¶ "You have no idea what Mother Nature is going to bring," she said. "They're already talking about frost this weekend. My costs could double."¶ She regrets not switching over to natural gas earlier this year when sewer line work in her neighborhood would have made it easier to run a gas line to her home. But she has a plan to keep a lid on her heating bills. "I'm going to buy a portable heater, an electric heater," she said.¶ That could help. Customers who use natural gas, electricity or propane will see lower bills than in a typical winter **because of relatively low prices**. For example, natural gas should average $10.32 per thousand cubic feet. That's 0.8 percent higher than last year but 13 percent lower than the five-year average.¶ "It's two different worlds. For most families this is still going to be an affordable year, except for those who use oil heat," says Mark Wolfe, the Executive Director of the National Energy Assistance Director's Association. "For them, it's going to be very difficult."¶ Rising heating oil costs come at a time when funding for low-income heating assistance is falling. Over the last two years, federal heating assistance funding has been cut to $3.5 billion from $5.1 billion. The number of households receiving assistance has dropped by 1.1 million over the period, according to Wolfe.¶ Just 6 percent of the nation's households use heating oil, but they tend to be in some of the coldest parts of the country where heating needs are high, mainly in the Northeast. About half use natural gas for heat and 38 percent use electricity. Five percent of households use propane and 2 percent use wood.¶ Electricity prices **will fall 2.3 percent** to 11.4 cents per kilowatt hour, the government estimates. Propane prices will fall 8 percent in the Midwest to $2.02 per gallon and 13 percent in the Northeast to $2.95 per gallon.¶ Natural gas, propane and electricity prices are relatively low because of a dramatic increase in domestic natural gas production over the last five years. Natural gas is used to generate about one-third of the nation's electricity and is instrumental in setting the price of electricity. Recently drillers have been increasing production of so-called natural gas liquids, including propane.

**3. Most recent EPA decision guarantees low prices**

**Platts Energy Week 8/27/12** ("Platts Energy Week TV: Analyst Sees $2 drop in U.S. Electricity Prices," http://www.platts.com/PressReleases/2012/082712/No)

A U.S. federal court decision last week striking down the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) attempt at regulating interstate emissions from coal-fired power plants **will likely mean electricity prices will drop between $1 and $2** per megawatt hour (MWh) **over the next two years**, an analyst for Standard & Poor's said Sunday on the all-energy news and talk program Platts Energy Week.

**2NC – Grid Safe**

**In house mitigation efforts solve**

**Aimone 9-12** (Dr. Michael, Director of Business Enterprise Integration – Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), “Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies,” 2012, <http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf>)

Chairman Lungren and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I was asked to address the question of how the Department of Defense (DoD) would operate during a significant outage of the commercial electric power grid. Although today’s hearing is focused on the prospect of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event, such an event is only one scenario for a grid outage. DoD is heavily dependent on the commercial electric power grid. The Department has two closely coordinated sets of activities that focus on the need to maintain critical mission activities in the event of a commercial grid outage. One set of activities, led by DoD’s office of homeland defense, is part of the Department’s explicit “mission assurance strategy.” The other set of activities, focused on the Department’s fixed installations and led by its Installations and Environment office, falls under DoD’s “facility energy strategy.” Mission Assurance Strategy The Department has long had a major focus on mitigating risks to high priority DoD facilities and infrastructure and the critical global missions they support. Toward that end, DoD recently adopted an explicit Mission Assurance Strategy, which is focused on ensuring operational continuity in an all-hazard threat environment. This strategy entails a two-track approach. Track I includes **"in-house" mitigation efforts**-- activities that the Department can execute largely on its own. A key element is DoD’s Defense Critical Industry Program (DCIP)—an integrated risk management program designed to secure critical assets, infrastructure and key resources for our nation. DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work closely together as part of DCIP. Under Track I of the Mission Assurance Strategy, DCIP will continue to update the list of DoD's most critical assets and target them for special mitigation efforts through DoD’s budget and other internal processes. Track II of our Mission Assurance Strategy tackles the many challenges to DoD mission execution that require external collaboration with partners such as the Department of Energy (DOE), DHS and industry. Given that DoD mission execution relies heavily upon the energy surety of the communities surrounding our installations, Defense Industrial Base facilities spread across entire regions, and on private sector infrastructure that will collapse without electricity, this two-track approach can help meet the challenges to DoD mission assurance that lie far beyond our military bases.

**Prefer our evidence—grid is actively improving**

**Koerth-Baker**, science editor – Boing Boing, columnist – NYT Magazine, electric grid expert, 8/3/**’12**

(Maggie, “Blackout: What's wrong with the American grid,” <http://boingboing.net/2012/08/03/blackout-whats-wrong-with-t.html>)

But this is about more than mere bad luck. The real causes of the 2003 blackout were fixable problems, **and** the good news is that, since then, **we’ve made great strides in fixing them.** The bad news, say some grid experts, is that we’re still not doing a great job of preparing our electric infrastructure for the future.¶ Let’s get one thing out of the way right up front: The North American electric grid is not one bad day away from the kind of catastrophic failures we saw in India this week. I’ve heard a lot of people speculating on this, but the folks who know the grid say that, while such a huge blackout is theoretically possible, it is also **extremely unlikely.** As Clark Gellings, a fellow at the Electric Power Research Institute put it, “An engineer will never say never,” but **you should definitely not** **assume** anything resembling **an imminent threat** at that scale. Remember, the blackouts this week cut power to half of all Indian electricity customers. Even the 2003 blackout—the largest blackout in North America ever—only affected about 15% of Americans.¶ We don’t know yet what, exactly, caused the Indian blackouts, but there are several key differences between their grid and our grid. India’s electricity is only weakly tied to the people who use it, Gellings told me. Most of the power plants are in the far north. Most of the population is in the far south. The power lines linking the two are neither robust nor numerous. That’s not a problem we have in North America.¶ Likewise, India has considerably more demand for electricity than it has supply. Even on a good day, there’s not enough electricity for all the people who want it, said Jeff Dagle, an engineer with the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Advanced Power and Energy Systems research group. “They’re pushing their system much harder, to its limits,” he said. “If they have a problem, there’s less cushion to absorb it. Our system has rules that prevent us from dipping into our electric reserves on a day-to-day basis. So **we have reserve power for emergencies**.”

**2NC – No Cyber**

**Terrorists can’t develop EMP**

**Rasor 7** (Dina, Investigative Journalist, “Checking the Pulse of EMP”, Project on Government Oversight, 1-17,

http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2005/11/checking\_the\_pu.html)

The Washington Time's Bill Gertz's account of the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack in his piece “U.S. seen vulnerable to space 'pulse' attack” relies on hype and distortion. Though EMP is a real effect of nuclear detonations and can wreak havoc on electrical systems and electronics, it would be difficult for terrorists to pull off. And nation-states that would attempt such an attack would face nuclear retaliation from the United States which, during the Cold War, shielded its nuclear command and control systems from the possibility of EMP effects from an exchange with the Soviet Union. There is a significant factual error in the Gertz piece. Gertz notes that "North Korea sells its own version of the Scud for around $100,000." As Steven Zaloga, a missile expert at the Teal Group Corporation and author of the book "The Scud," told POGO's Nick Schwellenbach for an article he wrote in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists this fall (paid subscription req'd), "A price of $100,000 for a Scud might refer to a non-working training model, but not a functional weapon." Zaloga is unsure what the going rate for a North Korean extended-range Scud would be, but a baseline Russian-made Scud (which are no longer made) would cost between $1 million and $2 million alone. The cost of the launch system would cost significantly more. If terrorists did manage to build a nuclear weapon it is **highly improbable** that they could produce an efficient EMP-producing nuclear weapon, according to nuclear physicist Richard Garwin, who also published one of the first theoretical papers on EMP. Philip Coyle, former Pentagon director of operational test and evaluation, emailed Global Security Newswire that even "the U.S. military does not know how to [create thermonuclear-scale EMP from a Hiroshima-sized weapon] today, and has no way of demonstrating the capability in the future without returning to nuclear testing." When the United States does not have this ability, needless to say, it's unlikely that terrorist or "rogue" states could easily accomplish such a technological feat. It is much more likely that terrorists would build a relatively low-yield improvised nuclear device (smaller in magnitude than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, yet still devastating if detonated in a city). States could assist terrorist groups in achieving an EMP attack, but this scenario still runs into the technological hurdles of producing a nuclear weapon that could produce significant amounts of EMP. Without such a Super-EMP weapon a terrorist group could not hope to impact a vast swath of the continental US with one weapon detonated at high altitude.

**Studies prove no cyberattacks.**

**The Register ’11** (John Leyden, 1/17, “Cyberwar hype is obscuring real security threats.” http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/17/cyberwar\_hype\_oecd\_study/)

Cyberwar hype is inhibiting government attempts to develop an appropriate response to cybersecurity threats, say computer scientists. A heavyweight study by UK computer scientists for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) concludes that it is "highly unlikely" there will ever be a "pure cyber war”, comparable with recent conflicts in Afghanistan or the Balkans. Suggestions to the contrary are down to "heavy lobbying" by suppliers, the report's authors – Professor Peter Sommer of the London School of Economics and Dr Ian Brown of the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford – conclude. It is unlikely that there will ever be a true cyberwar. The reasons are: many critical computer systems are protected against known exploits and malware so that designers of new cyberweapons have to identify new weaknesses and exploits; the effects of cyberattacks are difficult to predict – on the one hand they may be less powerful than hoped but may also have more extensive outcomes arising from the interconnectedness of systems, resulting in unwanted damage to perpetrators and their allies. More importantly, there is no strategic reason why any aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.

**2NC – Heg Defense**

**Reject their vague assertions for conflict scenarios absent hegemony – their authors overestimate the importance of the US - *star this card***

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

**Assertions that without** the combination of **U.S. capabilities, presence and commitments instability would return** to Europe and the Pacific Rim **are usually rendered in rather vague language**. If the United States were to decrease its commitments abroad, argued Robert Art, “**the world will become a more dangerous place** and, sooner or later, that will redound to America’s detriment.”53 **From where would this danger arise? Who** precisely **would do the fighting, and over what issues?** Without the United States, **would Europe really descend into Hobbesian anarchy? Would the Japanese attack** mainland **China again**, to see if they could fare better this time around? Would the Germans and French have another go at it? In other words, **where exactly is hegemony is keeping the peace?** With one exception, **these questions are rarely addressed**. That exception is in the Pacific Rim. Some analysts fear that a de facto surrender of U.S. hegemony would lead to a rise of Chinese influence. Bradley Thayer worries that Chinese would become “the language of diplomacy, trade and commerce, transportation and navigation, the internet, world sport, and global culture,” and that Beijing would come to “dominate science and technology, in all its forms” to the extent that soon theworldwould witness a Chinese astronaut who not only travels to the Moon, but “plants the communist flag on Mars, and perhaps other planets in the future.”54 Indeed Chin a is the only other major power that has increased its military spending since the end of the Cold War, even if it still is only about 2 percent of its GDP. Such levels of effort do not suggest a desire to compete with, much less supplant, the United States. The much-ballyhooed, **decade-long military buildup has brought Chinese spending up to somewhere between one-tenth and one-fifth of the U.S. level. It is hardly clear that a restrained United States would invite Chinese** regional, must less global, political **expansion.** Fortunately one need not ponder for too long the horrible specter of a red flag on Venus, since on the planet Earth, where war is no longer the dominant form of conflict resolution, the threats posed by even a rising China would not be terribly dire. The dangers contained in the terrestrial security environment are less severe than ever before. **Believers in the pacifying power of hegemony ought to keep in mind** a rather basic tenet: When it comes to policymaking, **specific threats are more significant than vague, unnamed dangers**. Without specific risks, it is just as plausible to interpret U.S. presence as redundant, as overseeing a peace that has already arrived. **Strategy should not be based upon vague images emerging from the dark reaches of the neoconservative imagination.**  Overestimating Our Importance One of **the most basic insights of cognitive psychology provides the final reason to doubt the power of hegemonic stability: Rarely are our actions as consequential** upon their behavior **as we perceive them to be.** A great deal of **experimental evidence exists to support the notion that** people (and therefore **states) tend to overrate the degree to which** **their behavior is responsible for the actions of others.** Robert Jervis has argued that two processes account for this overestimation, both ofwhichwould seem to be especially relevant in theU.S. case. 55 First, **believing that we are responsible** **for their actions gratifies our national ego** (which is not small to begin with; the United States is exceptional in its exceptionalism). The hubris of the United States, long appreciated and noted, has only grown with the collapse of the Soviet Union.56 **U.S. policymakers famously have comparatively little knowledge of—or interest in—events that occur outside of their own borders**. **If there is any state vulnerable to the overestimation of its importance due to the fundamental misunderstanding of the motivation of others, it would have to be the United States.** Second, policymakers in the United States are far more familiar with our actions than they are with the decision-making processes of our allies. Try as we might**, it is not possible to** fully **understand the threats, challenges, and opportunities that our allies see from their perspective.** The European great powers have domestic politics as complex as ours, and they also have competent, capable strategists to chart their way forward. **They react to many international forces, of which U.S. behavior is only one**. Therefore, for any actor trying to make sense of the action of others, Jervis notes, “in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, the most obvious and parsimonious explanation is that he was responsible.”57 **It is natural**, therefore, **for U.S**. policymakers and **strategists to believe that the behavior of our allies (and rivals) is shaped largely by what Washington does**. Presumably Americans are at least as susceptible to the overestimation of their ability as any other people, and perhaps more so. At the very least, political psychologists tell us, **we are probably not as important to them as we think**. **The importance of U.S. hegemony in contributing to international stability is therefore almost certainly overrated**. In the end, one can never be sure why our major allies have not gone to, and do not even plan for, war. Like deterrence, **the hegemonic stability theory rests on faith; it can only be falsified, never proven**. It does not seem likely, however, that hegemony could fully account for twenty years of strategic decisions made in allied capitals if the international system were not already a remarkably peaceful place. **Perhaps these states have no intention of fighting one another to begin with**, and our commitments are redundant. European great powers may well have chosen strategic restraint because they feel that their security is all but assured, **with or without the United States**.

**Empirically the world grew more peaceful when heg declined**

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p, Chetan]

It is perhaps worth noting that **there is no evidence to support a** direct **relationship between** the relative level of **U.S. activism and international stability**. In fact, **the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true**. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered** by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. **No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. **The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a** pressing **concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities**. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, **the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military** spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite effectively **without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

**Elections**

**US/Russian nuclear war causes extinction – its categorically different than other impacts**

**Bostrom 2** (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are **mere ripples** on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2%22%20%5Co%20%22) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3%22%20%5Co%20%22) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as **global** and **terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4%22%20%5Co%20%22)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

**A) Prefer state polls – better data, more accurate**

**Trende 10/31/12** (Sean, Senior Elections Analyst for RealClearPolitics, "What's Behind the State-National Poll Divergence?," http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2012/10/31/whats\_behind\_the\_state-national\_poll\_divergence\_115979.html)

After all, **there are several good arguments for favoring the state polling**: (1) you have more polls -- a much larger collective “n”; (2) **you compartmentalize sampling issues** -- pollsters focused exclusively on Colorado, for example, seem less likely to overlook downscale Latinos than pollsters with a national focus; and (3) **the state pollsters were better in 1996 and 2000**, two years that the national pollsters missed (although the truly final national pollsters in 2000 got it right, suggesting that perhaps there was a late shift in the race).

**B) Silver’s model is the best**

**Rothschild 2009** (David – Ph. D. candidate in the Department of Business and Public Policy at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, Forecasting Elections: Comparing Prediction Markets, Polls, and Their Biases, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 5, p. 895-916)

Starting in the 2008 Presidential campaign, Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight.com revolutionized election forecasting for the general public. Until his website was launched in March of 2008, those interested in predicting election outcomes typically reviewed national polling results that asked a representative cross-section of voters who they would vote for if the election were held that day. Yet, these raw poll numbers are volatile, **subject to random sampling error** on either side of the true underlying value. For example, on the eve of the 2008 Presidential election, national polls showed Obama’s lead over McCain ranging anywhere from 2 to 11 percentage points. Starting in the 2000 election cycle, poll aggregation organizations made an improvement by publishing less volatile averages of raw polls; the leading poll aggregators, Pollster.com and RealClearPolitics.com, both had ﬁnal averages showing Obama winning by 7.9 percentage points over McCain (the ﬁnal margin was 7.4 percentage points).1 Although an improvement over raw poll numbers, these estimates still succumb to two well-known poll-based biases, especially earlier in the cycle: polls demonstrate larger margins than the election results and they have an anti-incumbency bias (i.e., early leads in polls fade toward Election Day and incumbent party candidates have higher vote shares on Election Day than their poll values in the late summer into the early fall).2 Further, **they do not provide a probability of victory**. In contrast, FiveThirtyEight aggregates raw poll numbers, debiases them toward expected vote share, and then produces a probability of victory. After FiveThirtyEight’s strong showing in the Presidential primaries, the discussions of political junkies around the country quickly transformed from focusing on the latest polls to the probability of victory.

**The race will be tight --- but Obama holds the edge.**

**Blumenthal**, **10/25**/2012 (Mark – senior polling editor of the Huffington Post, Presidential Polls Counter Romney Surge Myth, The Huffington Post, p. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/25/presidential-polls-romney-surge_n_2016066.html?utm_hp_ref=mostpopular>)

New polls released on Wednesday and Thursday continue to show President Barack Obama holding narrow leads in a handful of **critical battleground states**, but running within a whisker of Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney nationwide. While Romney gained significantly in the wake of the first presidential debate in early October, the lack of a continuing trend over the past two weeks helps counter a theme in some campaign coverage that Romney's support continues to "surge" nationwide. The most recent updates of the seven daily national tracking polls continue to split in terms of which candidate holds the nominal lead, ranging from a 4 percentage-point lead for Romney on the Rasmussen Reports automated tracking to a 3 point Obama advantage on the Investor's Business Daily/TIPP poll. Separately, a new Associated Press/GfK survey released on Thursday morning showed Romney with a 2 percentage-point edge over Obama (47 to 45 percent). The HuffPost Pollster tracking model, which combines data from both national and statewide polling to create a combined estimate, continues to show a near tie, with just two-tenths of one percent separating Romney (47.1 percent) and Obama (46.9 percent) as of this writing. The model currently reports just 56 percent confidence that Romney is actually leading the national popular vote; slightly better than a coin-toss, but just barely.

**All of our evidence post dates – debate momentum won’t do it for him**

**Romney is bleeding momentum.**

**Politico**, **10/25**/2012 (Momentum Wars, p. <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1012/82902.html>)

In the past 10 days, Mitt Romney’s campaign has **gone from Big Mo to Slow Mo**. Like a shark that must swim forward and fast, the Romney campaign needs to maintain its forward momentum — and its heady narrative of an irresistible finish-line surge — despite an increasing pile of polling data pointing to a race that has stabilized since Barack Obama’s disastrous performance at the Oct. 3rd debate in Denver. “**Narrative” is an overrated and perishable commodity in politics**. But maintaining the perception of momentum has become critical to a challenger banking on a wave of last-minute enthusiasm to defeat an incumbent with a distinct electoral map advantage and small leads in Ohio, Iowa, Nevada and Wisconsin. The problem: despite a dramatically improved Romney position following the third and final presidential debate on Monday, his momentum in recent polls has **slowed discernibly**, owing, in part, to Obama’s stronger performances in the face-offs on Long Island and in Boca Raton.

**Romney will react in line with campaign rhetoric and Russia will react aggressively**

**Adomanis 10/23**/12 (Mark, international contributor @ Forbes, “How Will Mitt Romney Demonstrate 'Backbone' With Vladimir Putin?” http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/10/23/how-will-mitt-romney-demonstrate-backbone-with-vladimir-putin/)

Now because the debate was poorly run there wasn’t any follow-up on Romney’s proposed backbone-centric Russia policy. But it naturally raises a number of questions, the most obvious of which is “how would the Russians respond?” It’s worth trying to think through what a more combative **Russia policy** would achieve and what sorts of unintended consequences it might have because, at least as far as I can tell, it’**s** **one of the only areas of genuine disagreement between the two candidates and one of the few foreign policy changes we could realistically expect from a Romney administration.** Obama has been accused of being “soft” on Russia largely because of things he hasn’t done: he hasn’t signed, and has worked to delay passage of, the Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, he hasn’t aggressively responded to the recent expulsion of USAID, and he’s generally, though not entirely, refrained from criticizing Russian domestic policy. I think it’s fair to say that **Romney would support passage of** the **Magnitsky** bill, **would aggressively respond to the closure of USAID** (perhaps following David Satter’s advice of expelling a bunch of Russian diplomats), and would generally take a **hawkish** and **unaccommodating** line. **Though** Mitt **Romney’s website is still pretty scant** on the details of his proposed Russia policy, I don’t think it’s being uncharitable or unrealistic to say that Romney is contemptuous of and dismissive towards Russia’s current regime andthat **he would be much more aggressive in confronting Putin**.But the Russians aren’t automatons who have been programmed to behave in a specific way, they’re human actors who respond to external stimuli and changes in US policy. The fact that the Russians are more cooperative since the start of the “reset” isn’t some bizarre puzzle that needs to be explained, it’s exactly what we ought to expect. **Russia’s** limited **cooperation with the U**nited **S**tates **over the past four years hasn’t been by default** or because the Russians “had no other options,” **it has occurred because the Russian political leadership calculated that Russian interests were best promoted via cooperation with** the **Obama** administration. **But this calculation could easily change, and it doesn’t take an active imagination to think of a scenario in which Russia responds to an aggressive Romney** policy by doing something asinine like re-instating the S-300 sale to Iran. I understand that **Romney’s response during the debate wasn’t a detailed policy prescription** and that it’s unrealistic to expect extreme levels of detail from off-the-cuff and unprepared statements delivered live on national television. But the “backbone” comment is perfectly in keeping with Romney’s past statements on the issue. **Romney, and foreign policy hawks in general, take a strangely one-sided view of US-Russia relations**, **and** tend to **view it as an arena in which the US is the only party with any real agency**. **In this view** the Russians cooperate on issues like Afghanistan and Iran “because they have to” and **the US can afford to aggressively oppose other Russian policies without paying any cost.** But that’s clearly not the case. The **Russia**n government **has many interests but its first priority**, like any government, **is survival**. If the Russian government concludes that its survival might be threatened by Romney’s policies (**and since Romney openly declares his intention of replacing the current government they wouldn’t be unreasonable in reaching such a conclusion**) **they will oppose those policies with every means at their disposal**. Such an observation is hardly novel, but I’ve never seen anyone offer a coherent explanation of why the Russian government will continue to support Iran sanctions or the Northern Distribution Network in the face of aggressive attempts to weaken and marginalize it.

**Mariotte**, 6/5/**2012** (Michael – Executive Director and chief spokesperson for Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Nuclear Power and Public Opinion: What the Polls Say, Daily Kos, p. <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/06/05/1097574/-Nuclear-Power-and-Public-Opinion-What-the-polls-say>)

To try to get a better sense of what the public really thinks about nuclear power (and since we can’t afford to conduct our own polling), we took a look at **every poll** we could find on the issue, and related energy issues, over the past two years, and in some cases further back. Yes, that includes GOP/Fox News favorite Rasmussen. As DailyKos readers know, if not the general public, examining all the possible polls leads to a **much greater confidence in conclusions than relying on a single poll.** Thus, we have a fairly strong confidence that our conclusions are a good statement of where the American public is at on nuclear power and our energy future in the Spring of 2012. Conclusion 1: **The public does NOT want to pay for new nuclear power**. It IS willing to pay for renewable energy. This one is a slam dunk. New nuclear reactors are simply too expensive for utilities to build with their own assets. Nor are banks willing to lend money for most nuclear projects; they’re considered too risky given the long history of cost overruns, defaults, cancellations and other problems. Thus, the only two means of financing a new reactor are to either get money from taxpayers, through direct federal loans or taxpayer-backed loan guarantees, or from ratepayers in a few, mostly Southern states, which allow utilities to collect money from ratepayers before reactors are built—a concept known either as “early cost recovery” or Construction Work in Progress (CWIP). ORC International (which polls for CNN, among others) has asked a straightforward question for the past two years (March 2011 and February 2012) in polls commissioned by the Civil Society Institute: “Should U.S. Taxpayers Take on the Risk of Backing New Nuclear Reactors?” The answer? Basically identical both years: **73%** opposed in 2011, **72%** opposed in 2012. Maybe using the work “risk” skews the poll, you think? So ORC also asked, “Do you favor or oppose shifting federal loan guarantees from nuclear energy to clean renewables?” The answer was basically the same: 74% said yes in 2011, 77% in 2012 with 47% “strongly” holding that opinion both years.

**Solvency**

**Long timeframe to deployment**

**ITA, 11** – International Trade Administration (U.S. Department of Commerce, February. Manufacturing and Services Competitiveness Report. “The Commercial Outlook for U.S. Small Modular Nuclear Reactors.” http://trade.gov/mas/ian/build/groups/public/@tg\_ian/@nuclear/documents/webcontent/tg\_ian\_003185.pdf)

Although SMRs have significant potential and the market for their deployment is growing, their designs must still go through the technical and regulatory processes necessary to ensure that they can be safely and securely deployed. Lightwater technology–based SMRs may not be ready for deployment in the United States for at least a decade, and advanced designs might be even further off. Light-water SMRs and SMRs that have undergone significant testing are the most likely candidates for near-term deployment, because they are most similar to existing reactors that have certified designs and significant operating histories. NuScale is on track to submit its reactor design to the NRC by 2012, as is Babcock & Wilcox for its mPower design. In addition, GE-Hitachi, which already completed an NRC preapplication review for its PRISM reactor in 1994, plans to submit its PRISM design for certification in 2012.

**No solvency – siting**

**King et al, 11** – Research Analyst and Project Director at CNA Corporation's Center for Naval Analyses (Marcus, with LaVar Huntzinger and Thoi Nguyen, March. “Feasibility of Nuclear Power on U.S. Military Installations.” http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/Nuclear%20Power%20on%20Military%20Installations%20D0023932%20A5.pdf)

Finding specific sites for nuclear power plants on or near military installations will be challenging. There are many considerations that affect whether a site is appropriate. Some of the considerations relate to safety and others to limiting risks of attack or sabotage, and still others to public opinion. Being located on a military installation provides some advantages, but it also **imposes some constraints** on how portions of the installation near the nuclear power plant can be used. Trade-offs will be required.

**Licensing costs are a prohibitive barrier to SMRs.**

**Andres and Breetz**, February **2011** (Richard – Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and senior fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Studies at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and Hanna – doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications, p. 7)

Furthermore, the regulatory timeline and costs for licensing are also sources of **financial uncertainty**. NRC licensing processes have historically evolved around LWRs, and although NRC officials have begun dialogue on licensing for small reactors, they have estimated in the past that it could take a decade to develop new regulatory guides and licensing reviews.25 The NRC fee structure is also a **barrier for small reactors**. Under current regulations, the annual fee to operate each licensed nuclear reactor is **$4.5 million**—a **prohibitive cost** for many small reactor developers and users. The NRC is considering a variable fee structure based on reactor output, but it has deferred any actions or decisions until a licensing application is submitted.26

Accidents

**Extinction**

**Caldicott 94** (Helen, Australian Physician, Nuclear Madness, p. 21)

As a physician, I contend that nuclear technology **threatens life on our planet with extinction.** If present trends continue, the air we breathe, the food we eat, and the water we drink will soon be contaminated with enough radioactive pollutants to post a potential health hazard far greater than any plague humanity has ever experienced. Unknowingly exposed to these radioactive poisons, some of us may be developing cancer right now. Others may be passing damaged genes, the basic chemical units that transmit hereditary characteristics, to future generations. And more of us will inevitably be affected unless we bring about a dramatic reversal of the world’s pronuclear policies

**Developing nuclear power for the military results in the worst reactor designs – causes accidents**

**NewScientist, 11** (3/23, “Cut nuclear power's umbilical cord to the military.” http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20928052.600-cut-nuclear-powers-umbilical-cord-to-the-military.html)

One legacy of the cold war origins of nuclear power has been public distrust. Even though nuclear energy generation has killed far fewer people than many other energy sources (see "Fossil fuels are far deadlier than nuclear power"), it remains the most feared of all power generation technologies. Another legacy is engineering compromise. Because most nuclear power plants have been adapted from reactors developed for military applications, they are not necessarily the best designs. Of those, a handful of plants are notorious: Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and now Fukushima.

**A single accident turns the case – shuts down the nuclear industry**

**Squassoni, 8** – senior fellow and director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, former senior associate at Carnegie (Sharon, 3/12. "Nuclear Power in a Warming World: Solution or Illusion?" Testimony to the House Select Committee for Energy Independence and Global Warming. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19981&prog=zgp&proj=znpp)

A few caveats with respect to projecting nuclear energy expansion are necessary. Nuclear energy is undoubtedly safer and more efficient now than when it began fifty years ago, but it still faces four fundamental challenges: waste, cost, proliferation, and safety. It is an inherently risky business. Most industry executives will admit that it will only take one significant accident to plunge the “renaissance” back into the nuclear Dark Ages. Because of this, estimates are highly uncertain. For example, the U.S. Energy Information Administration does not use its computer model to estimate nuclear energy growth because, among other things, key variables such as public attitudes and government policy are difficult to quantify and project. That said, estimates tend to extrapolate electricity consumption and demand from gross domestic product (GDP) growth, make assumptions about nuclear energy’s share of electricity production, and then estimate nuclear reactor capacity.